

1970  
YEAR  
STAMP

SECURITY GRADING

N.B. The  
UPGRADE

Contents checked  
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*Reg P.O. Home*  
(Sgd.)

Date *4/2/71*

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

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NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. **NE** Q 3/548/1 (Part *(1-30)*)

TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN  
UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ

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P.H.	1	8/1	N.A.D. <del>P.H.</del>	(18)	11/9	P.H.	28	11/11
Reg.		22/1	Reg.		14/9			13/11
P.H.	6	10/12	P.H.	(18)	14/1	P.H.	(29)	1/1
Reg.		31/2	R		2/10	P.H.	(30)	25/11
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Regy		22/7	Regy		3/11			
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Regy		3/9	R		9/11			
A.C.R.M.	(18)	3/9	Oil Dept.	(28)	10/11			
Mr. Tripp		7/9	Regy		10/11			
Mr. Garton		9/9						

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1970



1.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 -1 JAN 1970
NE 23/548/1

Near Eastern Department

At his own request the Iraqi Ambassador will call on Mr. Luard at 11 a.m. on Tuesday, 13 January. This is a courtesy call, and Mr. Luard will not need a brief. Any points in the conversation worth recording will be noted by this office.

*K.I. Ferguson*

(K.I. Ferguson)  
31 December, 1969

~~AM~~ 5/1  
Mr. A. Luard.  
Mr. Luard or J.B. 5.1.

AM

1/1

Mr. Luard 6/1



2

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
- 8 JAN 1970

NEQ 3/548/1

MID 205/280/02

5 January 1970

P. 9.  
Jm  
12/1

Sir Hugh Parry CBE  
Middle East Development Division  
c/o British Embassy  
Beirut

Non-CENTO Technical Assistance Budget, November 1969

I enclose a copy of the latest edition of the non-CENTO technical assistance budget which was prepared at the end of November. As with the CENTO budget I apologise for the delay in circulating it, but this has been due to delays in copying on the present smaller size (which we hope users will find more convenient), and to sickness here.

2. The 1969/70 estimate still remains very close to the £600,000 aid framework figure but we feel that there is likely to be some slippage in this figure. In the circumstances, if either you or posts have worthwhile projects to put forward with implications for spending in 1969/70 we should of course be prepared to consider them. We do not want you to feel the shutters are up, although the likelihood of new expenditure this financial year must be receding.

3. With regard to 1970/1 we have not attempted to allocate the balance available between the various countries but will consider proposals on their merits as they arise. Of course, we have the target figure of £108,000 for Cyprus, and we would not expect to allocate much more to Lebanon than the £16,090 already shown.

4. We have included a column showing estimated expenditure in 1971/2 from existing or likely projects, and also receipts from local contributions (see paragraph 7 in cover sheet). The next budget exercise will show forecasts for 1971/72 in more detail on the usual basis.

5. I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Weir and Raftery (Bahrain), Wornop (Nicosia), Bullard (Dubai), Handerson (Qatar), Treadwell (Abu Dhabi), McKearney (Baghdad), Strachan (Amman), Given (Beirut), Craig (Jedda), and Evans, Edes and Fearn (FCO).

H B McKenzie Johnston

Enc

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
RESTRICTED  
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE

IRAQ

NUMBER	PROJECT	1969/70			1970/71			1971/72	REMARKS
		Firm	Probable	Possible	Firm	Probable	Possible		
A. COMMUNICATIONS									
	Baghdad Airport:								
	Electrical and mechanical engineer	-	1,000	-	-	5,000	-	4,000PR	Awaiting formal request
	Associated training for 6 technicians	-	1,000	-	-	5,000	-	5,000PR	Awaiting formal request
	Iraq Republican Railways:								
	Training in UK for								
	a. One engineer (one year)	-	-	-	-	-	1,270	-	} Awaiting formal requests
	b. One machine shop foreman (6 months)	-	-	-	-	-	900	-	
B. HYDROLOGY									
	AIKI Bawi, training in irrigation and land drainage at Southampton University (July 1968 - Sep 1969)	390P	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Total	390	2,000	-	-	10,000	2,170	9,000	Not discounted
	Less discount	-	1,000 (50%)	-	-	5,000 (50%)	1,736 (80%)	-	
	Net total	390	1,000	-	-	5,000	434	9,000	Not discounted
		<u>1969/70</u>			<u>1970/71</u>			<u>1971/72</u>	
Appropriations in Aid		NIL			NIL			NIL	
Total Discounted commitment		1,390			5,434			9,000	(Not discounted)

RESTRICTED





NNNN

BBC B

B17 ARABS NOT TAKEN IN BY BROWN BAGHDAD PAPER

(IRAQI NEWS AGENCY) BAGHDAD: COMMENTING ON THE RESULTS OF GEORGE BROWN'S VISIT TO ARAB COUNTRIES, 'AL-NUR' ASSERTS THAT BRITAIN INTENDED THIS VISIT TO COVER UP ITS REAL ANTI-ARAB ATTITUDE, AS EXPOSED BY THE CENTURION DEAL WITH ISRAEL. THE VISIT WAS ONLY A FURTHER DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO PUBLICISE A SURRENDER SOLUTION DRESSED UP AS A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

BROWN WAS NOT THE FIRST AND WOULD NOT BE THE LAST ENVOY, BUT THE VIGILANT ARAB PEOPLES WOULD NOT BE DECEIVED BY HIS ILK.

END BBC MON 1233 14/1 JM (KY)

Mr. Hinchcliffe  
Pa. NK/1000  
Relations b/c

PLM

21,

3

NE



Restricted

Mr. Long.

Any obs?



R.E.

6/1.

With the Compliments of

Mr. H.B. McKenzie Johnston

(i) Mr. Evans.

R.E.

T/I.

R.M. Evans, Esq.,

F. C. O.

None. All very logical  
& clear. A minute  
provision for Iraq:

£16,000 for Lebanon;

& £160,000 for Jordan  
with plenty of flexibility

...

6/1

MINISTRY OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT  
ELAND HOUSE, STAG PLACE, VICTORIA  
LONDON, S.W.1

(ii) Mr. Hinchcliffe

(iii) Enter & p.a.  
JORDAN?


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Page on Iraq

For BRITISH POLICY TO  
JORDAN FILE PMW



NNNN  
BBC B



④ Hirschchffe  
Mr. Atkinson

B7 IRAQI PAPER ATTACKS UK: +SIDING WITH ISRAELI GANGSTER ARMY+

NE  
(BAGHDAD RADIO) IN AN EDITORIAL ENTITLED +THE ARABS MUST ADOPT A FIRM ATTITUDE TOWARDS BRITAIN,+ 'AL-GUMHURIYAH' SAYS THAT THE SUPPLY OF BRITAIN TANKS TO THE ZIONISTS REAFFIRMS THE HOSTILE ATTITUDE BRITAIN HAS MAINTAINED AGAINST THE ARABS EVER SINCE IT ENTERED THE ARAB AREA. THE ARAB STATES MUST RECONSIDER THEIR RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND QUICKLY ADOPT A FIRM ATTITUDE AGAINST BRITAIN AND AGAINST BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE ARAB HOMELAND. THE SUPPLY OF TANKS TO THE ZIONISTS AT THIS CRUCIAL PERIOD MEANS THAT BRITAIN IS SIDING MILITARILY WITH THE ISRAELI GANGSTER ARMY AGAINST THE JUST ARAB STRUGGLE TO REGAIN THE USU

PED RIGHTS.

END BBC MON (KY) 19/1 EM 0907

P.A. Tray / UK  
relations pl  
PMA 241



29 JAN 1970

- 4 -

January 20th, 1970

(5)

Today's Main News And Trends, Cont'd

NEO 3/548/1

Enter Anglo Iraqi Relations  
Middle East**ITALY SAID TO HAVE ALERTED LEBANON ON  
IMMINENT ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST SOUTH**

Beirut's AL JARIDA, right-wing, today splashed across its front-page a story about an Italian warning to Lebanon that Israel was preparing a large-scale attack against south Lebanon. The undated story said that the Italian Embassy in Beirut has conveyed to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry information it had received from the Italian Embassy in Tel Aviv. Israel, the information said, according to AL JARIDA, is preparing a large-scale military operation against Lebanon in general and the south in particular, and that the operation will be carried out soon. The information has also been conveyed to the Big Powers, the story said.

The Lebanese Foreign Ministry, in turn, relayed the information to the Presidential Palace and to the Premier's office here, the paper said.

**COMMANDO OPERATIONS.** An Israeli spokesman announced in Tel Aviv yesterday that the Potash works at Sodom near the Dead Sea, were put out of action yesterday after it came under rocket attacks from the Palestinian commandos. He said that the commandos fired Katyusha rockets into the plant from the Jordanian area of Al Safi.

Fatah, in a communique yesterday, claimed credit for the operation. News of the attack on the plant received wide attention from the Arab radios and press today.

Meanwhile, Al Saiqa, the Syrian-backed commando group, has announced that its commandos Sunday night entered the occupied Kuneitra town in the Syrian Golan heights and attacked Israeli positions there, inflicting heavy losses on them. The Saiqa communique announcing the operation was top item in the newscasts last night and today by DAMASCUS RADIO, and made the banner-lines today in the Damascus papers.

**IRAQI CAMPAIGN AGAINST U.K.** The state-controlled press in Baghdad today continued its strong campaign against Britain over reports that the latter has sold 200 Centurion tanks to Israel since the June war. An editorial condemning Britain appeared in AL THAWRA, organ of the ruling Baath Party, today, and was reproduced by BAGHDAD RADIO.

Yesterday, AL JUMHOURIA, said to reflect Iraqi official thinking, called on the Arab states to reconsider their relations with Britain. It will be recalled that a campaign against Britain over the tanks had been waged by the Cairo information media.

**THE DILEMMA OF THE TWA HIJACKER HERE**

Belon

Hijacker Christian Belon and Lebanon appear to be in a dilemma now: what will Belon do, and what Lebanon should do about him, appears to be the basis of the dilemma. AL NAHAR reported that Belon's residence permit expires today, and that his continued presence here causes embarrassment for the Lebanese Government. Belon, it said, insists that he be brought to trial before a Lebanese court so as to avoid going to France, where he is bound to be prosecuted.

Another paper, AL JARIDA, said that Belon might be sentenced to death if tried in Paris, since the French law carries such a sentence for hijackers. It said that Belon will have to be returned to France if he is not referred to trial here in Lebanon.

It will be recalled that Belon recently hijacked a TWA plane from Paris to Beirut. He has been released on a symbolic bail of 25 Lebanese pounds.



**ME / 3288 / D / 3**

**The British imperialists justify violence from one side alone. They can justify the crimes by the people's executioners and exploiters; but the British imperialists become angry when they see these people rebel and take their revenge on the executioners and exploiters. They justify criminal violence because they belong to that category, and attack revolutionary violence because it is the means through which people can defend themselves...**

**Our people recall when the British invaded Iraq, persecuted the heroes of the 1920 revolution, entrenched the fonda...**



ME / 3288 / D / 4

ME / 3288 / D / 4

**While stating these facts, the Government of the Iraqi Republic feels astonished at the British information media's silence with regard to the daily crimes committed by the Zionist authorities against the Arab people. These crimes have taken the ugliest forms of murder, destitution, terrorisation and annihilation, to which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and Arabs are daily subjected.**

**(c) Baghdad home service in Arabic 04.00-05.45 GMT 24.1.70**



**20. 12 GMT (Text of report of Foreign Ministry protest to British Ambassador)**

**The Iraqi News Agency has learned that the Foreign Ministry summoned the British Ambassador in Baghdad yesterday afternoon and drew his attention to the unjust publicity campaign which the British information media had begun to wage against the Government of the Iraqi Republic and its progressive revolutionary march. It referred in particular to the fabrications broadcast by the BBC and later disseminated by Reuter and the London "Times" in the past two days.**

**The Foreign Ministry conveyed to the British Ambassador the Iraqi Government's and people's disappointment over these provocative attitudes which are undoubtedly intended to hurt the feelings of the Iraqi people. The Foreign Ministry stressed to the British Ambassador that these hostile campaigns would cause the greatest harm to relations between the two countries. It asked him to help to stop these campaigns and explained to him the Iraqi Republic's right to take all necessary measures to safeguard its security and national independence.**



**Asked if public trials had been held for those accused of being in the plot, he said: The results of the trials were broadcast to citizens on radio and television. He added: The proceedings of these trials will soon be announced to citizens. Recordings made during secret meetings between the plotters and officials of the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad and recordings of confessions by a number of plotters will also be broadcast...**

**Air Marshal Hardan Abd al-Ghaffar said in conclusion: Iraq will stamp out all dirty plots and those behind them. It clarified its policy in Proclamation No. 1 of the 17th July revolution. The revolution emerged to wage the battle with the Zionists and with Israel's supporters, the Americans and imperialism, which provide Israel with material aid for use against the Arabs and to enable Israel to seize Arab territory, to expel the Palestinians from their Arab homeland, and to deprive them of their legitimate right to a dignified life. He added: Iraq will define its attitude to the countries of the world in the light of their position with regard to the fateful, number one, Arab cause - Palestine.**



Iraq/UK relations

Ru  
PMM  
21

A. THE ARAB WORLD A RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

21 JAN 1970

NEQ3/5481

**Mr. George Brown's Departure from Israel****Israel in Arabic 11.00 GMT 19.1.70****Text of report:**

The Deputy Leader of the British Labour Party, George Brown, left Israel today after a five-day visit. At a press conference at Lydda airport George Brown said before his departure that, after his talks in Israel and after what he had heard during these talks, he had become more confident. He added that, after returning to London, he would make a deeper study of the material and documents he had collected during his visit to the Middle East; he would then exchange news with his colleagues in the Cabinet and the Labour Party on what action could be taken to solve the region's problem.

**Baghdad Radio on Anglo-US Arms Policy****Baghdad home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 18.1.70****Text of commentary:**

The attitude adopted by the imperialist forces - led by the USA and Britain - against the Arab nation is becoming clearer every day. Before the 5th June aggression and since the establishment of the Zionist State in Palestine, the US and British Governments have been pouring arms into the hands of the Zionist gangs. These arms are given either as gifts or grants or are paid for in one way or another by the US and British peoples. The two Governments have been giving these arms on the pretext that the balance of power in the Middle East must be maintained. This means balancing Israel's power with the combined power of all the Arab States.

Even so, this so-called balance of power - with all the injustice it does to the Arab nation - is not being observed in practice. The arms which have been given to Zionism far exceed those in the Arab States. The USA and Britain have withheld arms even from the pro-Western Arab States. Whatever arms they gave to some Arab States was very little and mostly obsolete or of the type intended for use in protecting the Governments of these countries from popular uprisings.

Although some Arab regimes constituted an important element in Western strategy, imperialist plans demanded the use of Arab territory as a base and the exploitation of Arab economic resources, especially oil. This policy stemmed from the imperialist camp's lack of confidence in Arab armies and their awareness of these armies' strong sympathy with the Arab popular movement.

After 5th June, the imperialist camp - particularly Britain - bragged about its interest in maintaining the stability of the Middle East and achieving lasting peace in the region. This claim for peace only meant entrenching Zionist existence on Arab territory and legalising Israel's gains before and after June 1967.

The USA and Britain went beyond their proclaimed policy. Despite the fact that Israel occupies the territories of three Arab States, let alone the territory of the Palestinian Arab people, arms continue to pour into the hands of the enemy. It is clear from the types of these arms that the aim is not only to enable Zionism to maintain its gains but to commit further aggression.



The Phantom aircraft which the USA has supplied will enable the enemy to penetrate deeper into Arab territory. They are not merely for defence. Britain has chosen to supply Israel with Centurion tanks to enable it expand its aggression.

What actually concerns us here is not the US attitude, which is outright hostility to Arab aspirations, but the British Government's policy of opportunism. The improvement which occurred in the British attitude for some time, has now turned out to be no more than a deception to make some of the Arab States restore their relations with Britain. It is understood that British economic interests in the Arab world demand that Britain preserve its diplomatic relations with all the Arab States. The contradiction between Britain's declared policy and her actual behaviour results from the British Government's desire to buttress the Zionist existence as well as to maintain its relations with the Arab States.

We therefore find it essential to reaffirm that our relations with the rest of the countries of the world will be defined by those countries' attitudes vis-a-vis our battle with Zionism. The Arab people are alert enough to detect all imperialist political tricks.

### Cairo Radio on William Rogers's Proposals

Cairo home service in Arabic 12.30 GMT 19.1.70

Excerpts from commentary by Sami Hasan Sirri:

Observers of the Middle East issue note that the USA is now causing a world-wide clamour by speaking of its wish for peace in the Middle East and by pretending to practise a balanced policy towards the two parties in the dispute. A recent example of this US action was the recent statements of Secretary of State, William Rogers, on what he termed his Government's wish for a lasting peace in the area. He carefully and sternly denied at the same time that the USA would sacrifice Israel for the sake of a peaceful Middle East settlement, confirming that the USA continued its basic support for Israel.

It is clear, therefore, that to continue the Israeli aggression is Washington's most important target. This objective is more important to the USA than the peace about which it is boasting...

But the actual events are completely different from the false statements. US actions on the Middle East issue conflict with peace... The US Secretary of State's statement reveals and confirms the objectives of his recent proposals for a settlement of the Middle East crisis, despite Roger's attempts to hide these objectives by speaking of the US wish for a lasting peace in the area.

In his proposals, Rogers demanded that Israel should retain part of the occupied Arab territories. The USA emphasised that it would see to it that the flow of arms to Israel would continue, secretly and openly, to enable Israel to maintain its occupation of the Arab territories...

Although the USA and Britain signed the UN Security Council resolution, which explicitly requires Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, these two States have decided to arm Israel to enable it to continue its aggression and to maintain its occupation and usurpation of these territories. This makes the USA, Britain and Israel directly responsible for the failure to implement the 22nd November 1967 Security Council resolution. Although this resolution does not call for negotiations, the US Secretary of State, in his proposals, adopted Israel's demand for negotiations before withdrawal to provide the aggressor with the opportunity of exploiting the fruits of his aggression and imposing conditions.



REGISTRY No. 10

21 JAN 1970

NEQ3/548/

*M. Hinchcliffe*

B18 BROWN - 2: BRITISH - IRAQI RELATIONS

THE CULTURE AND INFORMATION MINISTER, HAMID AL-JUBURI, ALSO RECEIVED MR. BROWN FOR ABOUT HALF AN HOUR. AL-JUBURI WELCOMED BROWN AND DESCRIBED HIM AS A PROMINENT PERSONALITY WHO UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEMS OF THIS AREA, PARTICULARLY WHEN HE WAS FOREIGN SECRETARY.

AL-JUBURI EXPRESSED IRAQ'S READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH BRITISH CULTURAL ESTABLISHMENTS. HE SAID IRAQ WANTED TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON THESE LEVELS AND HE HOPED MR. BROWN'S VISIT WOULD IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND BRITAIN.

MR. BROWN WELCOMED THE MINISTER'S PROPOSALS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD EXPAND IN FUTURE.

END BBC MON 1403 11/1 LF (KY)

*cut 6 Iraq / UK  
Fl. P.M.M. 21/1*

NNNN  
BBC B

*Pa P.M.M.  
21/1*

B19 DR. HORACE KING LEAVES CAIRO

(MON SVCE NOTE: FOR INFORMATION ONLY: NOT TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO MENA)

(MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY) CAIRO: DR. HORACE KING, SPEAKER OF THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS, LEFT CAIRO TODAY AFTER A SEVEN-DAY VISIT TO THE U.A.R. AT THE INVITATION OF THE U.A.R. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. HE WAS SEEN OFF AT THE AIRPORT BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT DR. LABIB SHUQAYR AND MEMBER OF THE ASU SUPREME EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, DR. KAMAL RAMZI ISTINU.

END BBC MON 1407 11/1 LF (KY)

*NE*



8

folio (6)

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to 1969 file.



(7)

CHURCH OF ENGLAND  
Council on Foreign Relations

President: The Archbishop of Canterbury  
Vice-President: The Archbishop of York  
Chairman: The Bishop of Winchester  
General Secretary: Canon J. R. Satterthwaite

PALACE COURT,  
222 LAMBETH ROAD,  
LONDON S.E. 1

Please address all communications to the  
General Secretary:  
TELEPHONE: 01-928 4880

JDI.

26th March, 1970.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
31 MAR 1970  
NEQ ~~222~~ 3/548/1

Dear Mr. Hinchliff,

Before Canon Satterthwaite left the office today he asked me to send you the enclosed copy of a letter which the Archbishop of Canterbury has sent, on his return from the United States, to His Excellency Mossn Al Hakim.

Reg. S.A.

PMMA

3112

Yours sincerely

Jane Inman

J. Inman.  
(Secretary to Canon Satterthwaite).

P. Hinchliff Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London S.W.1.



Lambeth Palace, S.E.1

16th March, 1970.

Your Excellency,

Having heard on my return to England of your illness, I send you my deep sympathy and pray that Almighty God will bless and protect you, granting you a speedy recovery and a safe return to your home country in due time.

Although I have, unfortunately, not been able to visit you personally, I am pleased to know that Canon Satterthwaite has been in to see you on my behalf, and kept me informed.

I send my best wishes to Your Excellency and to those who are nursing you at the present time and commend you in confidence to the hands of God.

Yours sincerely,

+ Michael

Archbishop of Canterbury

His Excellency Mossn Al Hakim,  
St. Paul's Hospital,  
Endell Street,  
London.W.C.2.



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APR 1970

NRQ 3/5/81

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And to \_\_\_\_\_

repeated for information to \_\_\_\_\_

Saving to \_\_\_\_\_

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Bagdad

No. 368

(Date) 6 April

And to:— 6/4

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[Take in A to B attached].

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MR HINCHCLIFFE NED

~~Mr. Jones~~

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MR DAVIES

MINISTER

OF

HEALTH

EXAMINED AT  
SIGNATURE

6/6/25

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

12402/16

16/52  
6/4/70



TO BRITISH EMBASSY

CYPHER

*A* BAGHDAD.

IMMEDIATE

*F* FOLLOWING FOR HAWLEY FROM DAVIES HEALTHMIN.

KEVIN HUGHES IS SENDING JOHN SERVICE FINANCE DIRECTOR GEC (WATSON) TO  
BAGHDAD 7 APRIL TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS FOR NEW CIVIL X-RAY EQUIPMENT  
REQUIREMENTS. SERVICE WILL CONTACT YOU ON ARRIVAL FOR USUAL SUPPORT.

*LB.*



9

R. 129 (Xen 3)

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Info: -  
M E D.  
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16 APR 1970  
NEQ 3/548/1

GRS 45

CYPHER CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO BOARD OF TRADE LONDON

TELEGRAM NO CRED A 42

15 APRIL 1970

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE.

YOUR CRED A 30.

CAN CONFIRM THAT IMPORT LICENCES ARE NOT BEING ISSUED TO IRAQI COMPANIES WHICH HAVE FOREIGN, AS OPPOSED TO SUBJECTS OF ARAB STATES, SHAREHOLDERS. HOWEVER, PROVIDED EXEMPTION IS GRANTED UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF RECENT COMMERCIAL AGENCIES LAW, THEN LICENCES ARE GRANTED.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS BOARD OF TRADE LONDON.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

Reg 6/4

mmmm  
16/4

NNNN



Please send copy to me at this address  
Room 121A



*With the compliments of*  
*W.G. - ASQUITH*

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY

14, Russell Square.  
London, W.C.1.

Tel. No. 01-636-6811  
Ext.....331.....

Date.....6.4.70.....

1599.6





(NEQ 3/548/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

10

28 April, 1970.

Country Assessment Sheets

... We have produced a revised version of the Country Assessment Sheet for Iraq which takes account of comments from your post, and from Functional Departments in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and which has now been agreed by the Steering Committee of Deputy Under Secretaries. I enclose two copies.

2. This Department is responsible for ensuring that this Assessment Sheet is kept up to date; and we shall have to ask you from time to time for your views on proposed revisions of it. However, if at any time you feel that changing circumstances warrant immediate amendment to the sheet, you will, no doubt, let us know. Section II of the sheet is shortly to be revised and probably produced separately from the other parts of the paper. No further effort should therefore be spent on revising this section for the time being.

(J.P. Tripp)

*PMMS*  
244

H.E. Mr. H.G. Balfour-Paul, CMG,  
BAGHDAD

CONFIDENTIAL



Country Assessment Sheet

6.3.70

IRAQ

Section I - British Objectives in Iraq

Britain's major interest in Iraq is the Iraq Petroleum Company, a British registered company in which B.P. and Shell together have a 47.5% holding. Anglo-Iraq relations in general are closely linked with the company's fortunes. We also share the common Western interest in preventing Iraq, which is still a non-aligned country, from slipping further under the economic and political control of the Soviet Union. But we dispose of little influence to this end least of all on our own.

2. Our specific tasks should therefore be to:

- (a) assist in maintaining the flow of oil, in safeguarding our investment in the IPC and encouraging a settlement between the company and the Iraqi Government on reasonable terms:
- (b) do whatever is possible to minimize Iraqi intervention to the detriment of British interests elsewhere (e.g. in Kuwait, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf and Jordan.
- (c) So far as we can, to further general Western interests in Iraq in collaboration with our allies.
- (d) increase our share of the expanding Iraqi market:
- (e) maintain and develop (through British Council and ODM) Anglo-Iraqi educational cultural and technical links.

3. General Anglo/Iraqi relations since 1958 have been carely satisfactory although commercial relations have been maintained and substantial respect for Britain and British goods continues in many quarters. Any improvement is limited by the following main factors:

1. Iraq's hard-line policy over the Arab/Israel dispute and the fact that it is unlikely that British policy towards Israel can be modified sufficiently to suit the Iraqis.
2. We would not wish to influence IPC to settle its dispute with Iraqi Government on terms which cannot be reconciled with interests of BP and Shell elsewhere.
3. We cannot supply Iraq with all the sophisticated weapons in which she sometimes shows an interest.
4. Hostile comment by British press and radio on Iraq's repressive and occasionally barbaric acts tends to irritate the Iraqi regime.



Section II - British Mission in Iraq: Direction of Effort

<u>Function</u>	<u>Output Budgeting Programme Category</u>	<u>Relative Importance (percentage)</u>	<u>Costed Manpower Effort</u>
International Organisation	1a	0	170
General representation VIPs	1b	5	4,950
Political interpretation	1b	21	25,000
Political negotiation (other than under 1a)	1b	10	9,000
Defence work (general)	1b	3	7,360
Public relations work in support of foregoing activities	1c	2	730
Defence sales	1d, IIa	8	8,240
Export promotion	IIa	20	17,300
Economic and commercial policy	IIb	12	7,350
Publicity for export promotion and economic publicity	IIc	6	1,420
Cultural work	IIId	2	920
Consular and immigration work	III, IVa	8	8,190
Aid	VI	3	930

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### Section III: Economic and Political Structure

Power in Iraq is constitutionally wielded by the 15 man revolutionary command council (RCC), of which the President is Chairman, and which is now largely identical with the regional (i.e. Iraqi) command of the ruling Baath party. Within it a small number of individuals retain a degree of personal influence distinct from their party standing. Below it the Council of Ministers acts as an advisory and executive agency. The armed forces, on whose support the regime in the last analysis depends, are formally commanded by the Minister of Defence in uneasy alliance with his fellow members of the RCC. Baath party penetration of the armed forces as of the civil service and security services, is extensive.

2. The Council of Ministers and the Planning Board exercise overall responsibility under the supervision of the RCC for economic planning and the 5 Year Plan. The Government controls nearly all aspects of the Iraqi economy but, although the Baath party have made pronouncements about total nationalisation, the private sector still remains important. The present Iraqi Government, like its predecessors, is aware that Iraq is over dependent on oil revenues and much of the annual development expenditure is aimed at boosting the agricultural sector and embarking on a programme of industrialisation. However, an increasing emphasis on defence expenditure has slowed down implementation of these plans.

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Country Assessment Sheet

Iraq

Section IV. Essential Facts

\* See Notes below

<u>Serial</u>		<u>Year</u>	
	<u>A - BASIC</u>		
1	Area	1969	171,600 sq. miles
2	Capital	1969	Baghdad
3	Population (a) total (b) average annual rate of increase 1957-65	1968	9 million (approximate figure) 3%
4	Religion(s)	1969	Shia and Sunni Muslim, Christian (Nestorian, Catholic, Orthodox) (about 2,000 Jews)
5	Official language(s)	1969	Arabic, Kurdish
6	Form of government	1969	Republic
	<u>B - DEFENCE</u>		
7	Proportion of G.N.P.	1967	12.5%
8	* (a) Navy	1969	600 men. 4 old river gun boats 8 inshore patrol craft 12 Komar FPBs 2 Mine sweepers 2 Torpedo Recovery vessels
	( ) Army	1969	80,000 men (40,000 Post-Service Reservists) 550 Tanks



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<u>Serial</u>		<u>Year</u>	
	(c) Air Force	1969	4,000 men 350 aircraft 95 fairly modern fighters 70 obsolete fighters
	(d) Police (? para-military or not)	1969	10,000 men including Civil Police Force and para military force "national guard" which is a private army run by the Ba'ath party, (Called out at times of national emergency) The Ba'ath party also runs an efficient secret police. (a branch of the Security Services).
9	Alliances or Treaties	1952	Member of the Eastern Command with Syria and Jordan. Member of the largely defunct Unified Arab Command
	<u>C - ECONOMIC</u>		
10	Currency exchange rates	1969	<sup>(Iraqi dinar)</sup> ID <sup>1</sup> = £1/7. 2 <sub>2</sub> (established November 1967), 2.80 U.S.\$ (established 1962)
11	G.D.P. at constant 1962 cost (IM.F. figure)		
	(a) total	1966	U.S. \$ 2363 million (IBRD statistics)
	(b) av. annual rate of growth (at constant prices)	1965-68	4%
	(c) per capita	1966	U.S. \$293.
12	Overall trade	1967	(i) Exports (excluding oil) US \$56 million (ii) Oil exports (income to government) US \$427 million
	(b) main export commodities (as a percentage of (a) (i))		Dates 28% Raw Wool 7% Cement 15% Barley 13% Raw Cotton 5%
	(c) principal markets	1967	Saudi Arabia 11% Lebanon 15% U.S.A. 6% Communist China 10% Kuwait 17.5%

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<u>Serial</u>		<u>Year</u>	
			India 6% U.K. 2,5%
	(d) imports, c.i.f.	1967	U.S. \$423 million
	(e) principal suppliers	1967	U.K. 14.3% West Germany 11.6% Japan 6.5% U.S.S.R. 4.7% Italy 4.5%
13	Balance of payments (a) goods and services	1967	U.S. \$ 21.6 million
	(b) trade balance, f.o.b.	1967	U.S. \$146 million
14	Official reserves	1969 (June)	U.S. \$452 million
15	Aid (a) donor or recipient	1969	Recipient
	(b) amount (to or from where and in what proportions)	1969	Unknown amount of Soviet military aid U.S. \$ 84 million loan from GDR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM USSR APPROXIMATELY U.S. \$ 100 MILLION
		1967	IBRD \$7.71 million, Kuwait U.S. \$14 million U.N. Agencies U.S. \$ 2.55 million
		1968	Soviet aid approximately U.S. \$120 million (mostly military). (SOVIET TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SINCE 1959 :- US \$ 137 MILLION. SOVIET MILITARY AID SINCE 1958 U.S. \$ 920 MILLION)

D - BRITISH INVOLVEMENT

Politico/Defence

16	Treaty or quasi-treaty	1969	None
17	Defence facilities available to U.K.	1969	None
18	Military assistance from U.K.	1969	£0



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<u>Serial</u>		<u>Year</u>		
19	Diplomatic representation (excluding DWS staff and other Departments' staff)		27 U.K. based staff	
	Cost of Diplomatic representation		£313,000 pa.	
20	British Council expenses in Iraq <del>(revenue)</del> <i>Exclusive of Council Headquarters expenditure</i>	1969/70	£38,767 (Revenue £4,030)	4 UK based staff
		<del>1969/70</del>	<del>£539</del>	
21	Resident Community	1969	954 (including wives and children of Iraqis)	
	<u>Economic</u>			
22	U.K. trade (a) exports + re-exports (f.o.b.)	1968	£16 million (3% total British exports)	
	(b) Imports (c.i.f.)	1968	£25.8 million (3% total U.K. imports)	
23	• Aid (a) capital	1969	£0	
	(b) technical assistance	1969	£3,000 (estimate) £2,995 m. 1968	

E - ANY SPECIAL ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Iraq, like most other Arab countries, enforces the regulations of the Arab Boycott Office. Thus, trade is banned with Israel and Iraq also has widened the embargo to include (as she sees it) the main supporters of Israel, the U.S.A. and the Federal Republic of Germany.

As a temporary measure Iraq has banned trade with those countries with which she has an unfavourable trade balance. At present these are:- Italy, Japan and Hong Kong.

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Country Assessment Sheet

IRAQ

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M. Hindle  
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W11

Mr. Hayman

Country Assessment Sheets

Near Eastern Department have now, very belatedly I am afraid, sent in the first revised version of the Country Assessment Sheets of all the countries for which we are responsible. One of these, that on Lebanon, has already been considered by the Deputy Under-Secretaries Steering Committee. A second, that on Iraq, is to be considered at the Committee's meeting on 24 March. So far as I know, no date has been fixed for the consideration of the other Sheets. Nor is any of our posts scheduled for inspection in the immediate future, so that the Country Assessment Sheets will not be used for their primary practical purpose in the next month or more. They may, however, like that on Lebanon, be the subject of discussions with other Departments in London before any Inspections take place.

2. I have of course tried to ensure that the C.A.S.'s for N.E.D.'s countries are compatible. But I have been struck by the difficulty of breaking down the analysis of our political aims in the area as a whole into elements related to our relations with and objectives in each individual country. The two broad political themes which I have particularly in mind are the Arab/Israel dispute and our policy towards it and, secondly, Soviet penetration of the Arab world and the Western interest in containing it. For this reason, it occurs to me that in order to make the C.A.S. exercise as useful as possible, there would be advantage in preparing for the Middle East as a whole (and possibly for other regions) a short covering note stating general British objectives in the area and an assessment of our ability, either alone or in conjunction with our allies, to influence the course of events in a favourable direction. The sort of paper I have in mind would be, both in scope and in length, comparable to Section 1 of the C.A.S. for any one country.

3. You may wish to discuss this idea with me and possibly to raise it at the Deputy Under-Secretary's meeting on 24 March when the Iraq C.A.S. is discussed.

4. I think that in any case it will be desirable for N.E.D., Arabian Department and N.A.D. to look together at the first revised versions of all their C.A.S.'s when these have been approved with a view to ensuring that they are mutually compatible.

J.P. Tripp  
(J. P. Tripp)  
9 March, 1970  
N.E.D.

25/3



12A9/UK 6228  
**A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL**

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 26 JUN 1970 NEQ3/548/1
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**Baghdad Radio on British Policy****Baghdad home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 23.6.70****Text of commentary:**

The British East-of-Suez policy is subject to many influences, making it sometimes appear contradictory. Britain is deeply concerned about her economic interests and is facing two challenges. The first, a fundamental one, is the conflict between her presence in the area and the Arab people's interests; and the second, a secondary one, is the strong competition between Britain and her Western allies, particularly the United States, for ownership of oil resources and for the area's strategic position.

Britain finds herself in constant need of her allies' support to repel the current of the Arab revolution, provided such support does not exceed the limit and seek to share the booty, or to seize it altogether as happened in Iran when the United States exploited the conflict between the old Empire and the Mosaddeq national Government, dealt the conflicting sides a blow and became the only party to benefit from the Shah's kingdom.

Britain finds that the stupid new US policy facilitates the attainment of Britain's targets because the Americans are ready to fight an all-out battle against the Arab peoples. Indeed, they are already fighting this battle in their numerous attitudes - towards the Palestine issue, the liberated Arab regimes, the Arabian Gulf and [word indistinct]. Britain's attitude to these issues is no different from that of her US ally; Britain sides with Zionism against the Arab people and is against the liberation movements in our homeland. But Britain has behaved with extreme care and caution and has thus remained in the rear of the confrontation line with the Arabs. Despite her support of the June aggression and her supply of various kinds of weapons to Israel, foremost the tanks, Britain has managed to escape the violent Arab reaction to which the United States has been subjected.

However, the UK's opportunist policy in Palestine finds itself facing serious difficulties in the Arabian Gulf. The United States was prepared to seize the area even before Britain attempted to change her old imperialist form to a new one. Iran was selected to execute the plan. Why did Britain not insist on staying where she was without giving the Gulf a form of bogus independence? The answer is that Britain would have been unable to meet the fundamental challenge, namely the Arab revolution.

All these facts explain to us Britain's vacillation between the policy to leave and the policy not to leave the area. It seems that the Conservative Party has decided to stay and face the Arab challenge. In that case the British will benefit from US support and that of their other allies in facing the Arab revolution while continuing to hold on to the oilfields.

In the view of the revolution Government of the Iraqi region, the issue can be summed up as follows:

(1) The vacuum theory is a false imperialist allegation. The heart of the issue lies in the existence of the Arab people and their desire to live free of any kind of chains.

(2) The Arab nation refuses to allow a repetition of the 1948 tragedy. Britain cannot exchange her mandate for a colonialist invasion as she did in Palestine.

P. P. M. 29/6



(3) Due to its national commitments and its ideological convictions, the revolution Government in the Iraqi region is obliged to accord the people of the Gulf its protection and support. Our struggling President's recent statements to Libyan newspaper 'Ath-Thawrah' are simply a sincere appeal to the Arab nation to prepare for a battle which must be fought sooner or later.

#### Moshe Dayan on the Military Situation

Israel home service in Hebrew 14.00-19.00 GMT 23.6.70

14.00 GMT: Text of report of Dayan's comments on 'New York Times' report:

The Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, said again today that Soviet pilots were flying operational missions over Egypt west of the Suez Canal, but that they avoided entering into air battles with our pilots. Dayan was commenting on reports by the 'New York Times' Washington correspondent that Soviet pilots were only making training flights over Egypt and that since the middle of last month the number of these flights had decreased. The Defence Minister said that to the best of his knowledge the reports of the 'New York Times' correspondent were incorrect.

Dayan said if the Soviet pilots wanted to intervene in battles with our pilots they would find an opportunity to do so. The fact that they had not wanted to, and had not done so, was not accidental but reflected Soviet policy in the Canal region.

Asked whether he expected, as he said some time ago, a hot summer along the cease-fire borders, the Defence Minister said: If one judges the situation by the number of our casualties - and this is our criterion - we are already in a hot summer. The number of our losses in May and June this year is larger than last summer and this summer is also difficult from the military point of view.

15.00 GMT: Excerpt from report of Dayan's statements at the Jerusalem Press Club:

... In reply to a question, the Defence Minister said there was no doubt that if the Soviet Union wanted to enter the war in our region in full force, then the State which could stand up to such entry was the USA. Dayan added he would be glad if the Russians realised this.

In reply to another question, the Defence Minister said that no contradiction existed between his declaration that Israel would be ready to restore much to the Arabs in exchange for peace, and his objection to an Israeli declaration that Israel was ready to accept and implement the Security Council resolution. Dayan said that Israel must take care to ensure that the majority of its population would be clearly Israeli and would not include a large foreign, Arab minority.

As for the Security Council resolution, Dayan said that Ambassador Tekoah's announcement at the UN did not imply that Israel was committed to implement the Security Council resolution. He stressed that the Council resolution was highly complex and left much room for interpretation. This did not mean, he said, that within the framework of a peace settlement with our neighbours we would not be ready to make territorial concessions.

The Defence Minister was speaking at the Jerusalem Press Club as the guest of the Journalists' Association.



EN CLAIR  
ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 455

27 JUNE 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 455 OF 27 JUNE AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, KUWAIT AND TEL AVIV. IRAQI PRESS REACTION TO ELECTION OF CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
29 JUN 1970

EDITORIAL COMMENT IN THE IRAQI PRESS ON THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY OF THE NEW CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT TAKES THE LINE THAT THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT WILL BE EVEN MORE FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TO ISRAEL THAN THE PREVIOUS LABOUR GOVERNMENT.

THE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER AL JUMHURIYAH OF 20 JUNE REVIEWS THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT'S SO-CALLED SUBSERVIENCE TO UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR AND SUPPLY OF ARMS TO ISRAEL. THE EDITORIAL CLAIMS THAT SINCE FOREIGN POLICY WAS NOT AN ISSUE IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THE NEW CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ISRAEL AND EVEN, IN VIEW OF THE DEEP ROOTED RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND THE WORLD ZIONIST MOVEMENT, BECOME MORE HOSTILE TO THE ARABS. THE SAME NEWSPAPER ON 23 JUNE CONTINUES THIS THEME SAYING THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN DELIGHTED WITH THE RESULT OF THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION. IT STATES THAT IT WAS THE CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION WHICH PRESSED FOR THE SUPPLY OF CHIEFTAIN TANKS TO ISRAEL IN 1969. THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER ON 25 JUNE SPEAKS OF THE TORY SUPPORT FOR "AGGRESSIVE AND RACIALIST REGIMES" AND QUOTES REPORTS THAT THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT IS PLANNING TO SELL CHEIFTAIN TANKS TO ISRAEL.

2. THERE HAS IN CONTRAST BEEN COMPARATIVELY LITTLE SPECULATION ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF. AL JUMHURIYAH ON 20 JUNE ALLEGES THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN IN OPPOSITION HAD PROMISED NOT TO WITHDRAW BRITISH FORCES FROM THE GULF IF HE CAME TO POWER. THE EDITORIAL SAYS THAT EVEN IF THE NEW CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DECIDE NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GULF THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE ARAB LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN AS MUCH AS IT WOULD ASSIST IN THE EXPLOITATION OF THIS DISPUTE IN THE ARAB STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM GENERALLY. ( THIS APPEARS TO MEAN THAT THE STRUGGLE AGAINST A CONTINUED BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD BE A FOCUS FOR THE STRUGGLE TO EXPEL ALL FORMS OF IMPERIALISM FROM THE MIDDLE EAST.).


MR. BALFOUR PAUL

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION  
NEAR EASTERN DEPT

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LAST REF.	
NEXT REF.	



A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAELBaghdad Radio on British Policy

Baghdad home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 23.6.70

Text of commentary:

The British East-of-Suez policy is subject to many influences, making it sometimes appear contradictory. Britain is deeply concerned about her economic interests and is facing two challenges. The first, a fundamental one, is the conflict between her presence in the area and the Arab people's interests; and the second, a secondary one, is the strong competition between Britain and her Western allies, particularly the United States, for ownership of oil resources and for the area's strategic position.

Britain finds herself in constant need of her allies' support to repel the current of the Arab revolution, provided such support does not exceed the limit and seek to share the booty, or to seize it altogether as happened in Iran when the United States exploited the conflict between the old Empire and the Mosaddeq national Government, dealt the conflicting sides a blow and became the only party to benefit from the Shah's kingdom.

Britain finds that the stupid new US policy facilitates the attainment of Britain's targets because the Americans are ready to fight an all-out battle against the Arab peoples. Indeed, they are already fighting this battle in their numerous attitudes - towards the Palestine issue, the liberated Arab regimes, the Arabian Gulf and [word indistinct]. Britain's attitude to these issues is no different from that of her US ally; Britain sides with Zionism against the Arab people and is against the liberation movements in our homeland. But Britain has behaved with extreme care and caution and has thus remained in the rear of the confrontation line with the Arabs. Despite her support of the June aggression and her supply of various kinds of weapons to Israel, foremost the tanks, Britain has managed to escape the violent Arab reaction to which the United States has been subjected.

However, the UK's opportunist policy in Palestine finds itself facing serious difficulties in the Arabian Gulf. The United States was prepared to seize the area even before Britain attempted to change her old imperialist form to a new one. Iran was selected to execute the plan. Why did Britain not insist on staying where she was without giving the Gulf a form of bogus independence? The answer is that Britain would have been unable to meet the fundamental challenge, namely the Arab revolution.

All these facts explain to us Britain's vacillation between the policy to leave and the policy not to leave the area. It seems that the Conservative Party has decided to stay and face the Arab challenge. In that case the British will benefit from US support and that of their other allies in facing the Arab revolution while continuing to hold on to the oilfields.

In the view of the revolution Government of the Iraqi region, the issue can be summed up as follows:

(1) The vacuum theory is a false imperialist allegation. The heart of the issue lies in the existence of the Arab people and their desire to live free of any kind of chains.

(2) The Arab nation refuses to allow a repetition of the 1948 tragedy. Britain cannot exchange her mandate for a colonialist invasion as she did in Palestine.



(3) Due to its national commitments and its ideological convictions, the revolution Government in the Iraqi region is obliged to accord the people of the Gulf its protection and support. Our struggling President's recent statements to Libyan newspaper 'Ath-Thawrah' are simply a sincere appeal to the Arab nation to prepare for a battle which must be fought sooner or later.

#### Moshe Dayan on the Military Situation

Israel home service in Hebrew 14.00-19.00 GMT 23.6.70

14.00 GMT: Text of report of Dayan's comments on 'New York Times' report:

The Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan, said again today that Soviet pilots were flying operational missions over Egypt west of the Suez Canal, but that they avoided entering into air battles with our pilots. Dayan was commenting on reports by the 'New York Times' Washington correspondent that Soviet pilots were only making training flights over Egypt and that since the middle of last month the number of these flights had decreased. The Defence Minister said that to the best of his knowledge the reports of the 'New York Times' correspondent were incorrect.

Dayan said if the Soviet pilots wanted to intervene in battles with our pilots they would find an opportunity to do so. The fact that they had not wanted to, and had not done so, was not accidental but reflected Soviet policy in the Canal region.

Asked whether he expected, as he said some time ago, a hot summer along the cease-fire borders, the Defence Minister said: If one judges the situation by the number of our casualties - and this is our criterion - we are already in a hot summer. The number of our losses in May and June this year is larger than last summer and this summer is also difficult from the military point of view.

15.00 GMT: Excerpt from report of Dayan's statements at the Jerusalem Press Club:

... In reply to a question, the Defence Minister said there was no doubt that if the Soviet Union wanted to enter the war in our region in full force, then the State which could stand up to such entry was the USA. Dayan added he would be glad if the Russians realised this.

In reply to another question, the Defence Minister said that no contradiction existed between his declaration that Israel would be ready to restore much to the Arabs in exchange for peace, and his objection to an Israeli declaration that Israel was ready to accept and implement the Security Council resolution. Dayan said that Israel must take care to ensure that the majority of its population would be clearly Israeli and would not include a large foreign, Arab minority.

As for the Security Council resolution, Dayan said that Ambassador Tekoah's announcement at the UN did not imply that Israel was committed to implement the Security Council resolution. He stressed that the Council resolution was highly complex and left much room for interpretation. This did not mean, he said, that within the framework of a peace settlement with our neighbours we would not be ready to make territorial concessions.

The Defence Minister was speaking at the Jerusalem Press Club as the guest of the Journalists' Association.



Mr Ege

A good letter, but with some traces of special pleading.  
BRITISH EMBASSY.

15 AAA



BAGHDAD

Enter  
to submit

4 July, 1970. (Amman 11/10/1970)

CONFIDENTIAL 17 July

I think this is for NED. to answer, although I would like to discuss the substance. Cd. we seek to consult Iraq a little about the July. Cd. we ask them to join in a public declaration of support for the UAE?

① in Trip 09.7.  
Mr Ege  
We will consider  
② Back to me. 9/7

Think we shall  
my 16 meet  
(2/12) Mr B.P.  
on some of these  
points.

97

Dear Acland,

I have not previously commented on Cassandra's suggestion that our interests in the Gulf might best be served by trying (as Stewart Crawford puts it in his letter 3/15 of 23 June) to make friends with the Iraqi Ba'ath. It seemed to me a safe bet that on this particular ride the unhorsing of Cassandra could safely be left to someone else.

NB3/5481  
9

2. Such comments as I offer now are emphatically not meant as a recommendation in favour of a radical change of policy towards the Iraqi régime, even if there is a risk of their turning out the winner in Sam Falle's decolonisation stakes (paragraph 13 of his letter 3/6 of 14 June). NBK4/2.11

3. All I wish to suggest is that there has been in recent months a slight but detectable change for the better in Iraqi postures and that a slight but detectable change in our own counter-postures might be useful.

4. The sort of indicators of a growing sense of realism and moderation on the part of this régime which I have in mind (they have all been reported in one form or another and I will not weary you with references) are:

(a) On Palestine, what seems like a genuine attempt to mediate helpfully in the recent Jordan imbroglio; and public admission by President Bakr that a peaceful solution is not ruled out by definition, provided it is not imposed against the will of the Palestinians.

None to keep  
S.M.A. & C.

(b) Internally, the expulsion of some of the wild boys from the heights of power, the most recent being Salah Omar al Ali; and the studied moderation of recent pronouncements by Saddam Hussain, now universally regarded as the Party pace-maker.

As a result of  
an internal  
Power struggle  
not just because  
he was "wild"

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
10 JUL 1970  
NED  
NB3/5481

A.A. Acland, Esq.,  
Arabian Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Answer (17)

P.O. P.M. 20/7

LAST  
DES.





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- (c) In their relations with the Communist countries a perceptible cooling off on the Iraqi side marked by signs of dissatisfaction on the other side. Frequent reminders that the Communist revolution and the Arab revolution are two different things. ✓
- (d) In their relations with ourselves, repeated assurances that, whatever major differences exist, they want good working relations with us, more technical assistance, etc., and that they emphatically do not relish increased dependence on one side in the great divide.
- (e) An impression amongst observers here that the régime, now firmly in the saddle, is maturing with the prolonged exercise of power, suspects that extremism does not necessarily pay and that friends, external as well as internal, are positively desirable.

5. One can of course quote plenty of counter-indicators but they are mostly of a minor kind. The balance is on the right side. I am not suggesting that their long-term aims and ambitions are any different; but perhaps they recognise that some of the traffic lights have changed to red and that they had better drive cautiously if they want to reach their destination.

6. This is little enough to build on; but if, as many people seek to persuade me, they are signalling to us after their fashion, there is something to be said, in our future interests, for signalling back. Saddam Hussain is certainly the man with the flags at this end. Would an official invitation to England raise too many eyebrows? Failing this, some other sign of a willingness on the part of our new Government to exchange views, e.g. by proposing a ministerial visit here, on the way perhaps to or from Iran, would help. Certainly some indication, as I have suggested in other correspondence, that we recognise the legitimacy of their interests in the Gulf even if we do not approve their manner of pursuing them, might encourage a better understanding on their part of our own (and other peoples') interests. Similarly, a re-statement at high level of our readiness to contribute, so far as circumstances allow, to the development of Iraq would

✓

/help

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help to disabuse the régime of any idea that we are out to subvert it. I need not mention again the key political desideratum of a settlement of the I.P.C. dispute.

✓ 7. What I am suggesting, in short, is that without any major or conspicuous change of attitude we might encourage, if not virtue, at least a reduction in vice by sending a judicious signal in the direction of the Ba'ath. I should have thought this could be done without alarming other Governments in the area, provided they were told what it was for.

*Yours ever*  
*H.G. Balfour Paul*  
(H.G. Balfour Paul)

Copies to: Sir S. Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,  
H.M. Political Resident,  
Bahrain.

W. Morris, Esq., C.M.G.,  
H.M. Ambassador,  
Jedda.

D. Murray, Esq.,  
H.M. Ambassador,  
Tehran.

S. Falle, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.C.,  
H.M. Ambassador,  
Kuwait.

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Call on Vice-President Saddam Hussain

My request for audience with Saddam Hussain, specifically to talk about the treatment of Mr. Rogers of Sir Alexander Gibb, having received an unexpectedly rapid response, I had a three-quarters-of-an-hour conversation with him in his office in the M.F.A. yesterday. I had taken Mr. Rogers with me to the Ministry but he was not invited to join me in Saddam's office. (Mr. Rogers had incidentally received an answer from the D.G. of Roads and Bridges that morning to his letter of 11 June requesting immediate "arrangements to enable him to leave Iraq". The answer simply said he must stay put till the airport investigations were completed.)

2. Saddam claimed to know only the bare outlines of the case so I began by filling him in both on the history of the airport consultancy and on my endless representations on the subject. I emphasised particularly:

- (a) The way that Iraqi "administrative constipation" (a term he seemed to like) had dragged out what should have been a three-year construction job into twelve years - and it still was not finished.
- (b) The unprecedented nature of the treatment meted out to a world-famous firm of consultants, whose experience in constructing airports (apart from anything else) was without equal.
- (c) The impression spreading in Britain as a result of this and similar episodes that Iraq was not a place to work in if you wanted a fair deal. Coupled with Iraq's propaganda policy of repelling rather than inviting sympathy in the U.K. for Iraqi attitudes, all this was not only lamentable in itself, but must have an adverse effect on Iraq's own interests.

/(a)

Copy

Not action on NEQ 18/5

NEQ 3/548/1

What is the Arabic for this?

جسر البطين ايلاد ري ؟

c.c. to:

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

R.H. Ellingworth,  
Esq.,  
Commodities & Oil  
Dept.,  
F.C.O.

LAST	
OFF	
NEXT	
REV	



CONFIDENTIAL

(d) Gibb's were still prepared in accordance with their traditional policy of cooperation with client governments, to help the Iraqis out if the restriction order on Mr. Rogers was withdrawn and an indication was given of Iraqi willingness to pay fees and wages outstanding.

3. Saddam at once said that he took the point in (c). Iraq's reputation was important. He would go into the case thoroughly and let me have a detailed reply to my representations, via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. Later in the conversation I took the opportunity to mention the case of Parsons Power Gas and the Sulphur Extraction Plant. Saddam broke in to say (in so many words): "Look here, we have already admitted that the British company was quite right and that we have been let down by Iraqi consultants". I pointed out the relevance of (c) above to the Government's appeal to P.P.G. to come back and help. In view of the treatment meted out to Gibb's in general and Mr. Rogers in particular, P.P.G. might think twice before setting foot again in Iraq; and we went over this ground again. And when I finally left I said that I hoped he would not simply send me a detailed reply, as he had promised, but would also "solve the problem". His last words were "I hope so. It is a small matter".

5. During our conversation Saddam predictably referred to the major differences outstanding between Britain and Iraq, i.e. Palestine and the IPC. He said I would remember, as he did, what we had said to each other on the subjects last December. On Palestine, could not Britain bring herself to follow the example of France and be restored to the good books of the Arabs instead of driving them further and further into the arms of Moscow? If I would study history since the October Revolution in Russia, I would see step by step the inexorable consequences of our policy towards the Arabs. As he had told me before, he regarded communism and Iraq's dependence on the Soviet Union with the utmost distaste. As for the IPC dispute, he accepted without demur my charge that Iraq had "lost millions through its obstinacy", but insisted that this obstinacy (he used the same strongish term in Arabic as I had) was politically



inescapable. The issue was a matter of national pride. They emphatically wanted a settlement but the initiative must, for psychological reasons, come from the other party. If a small man, sitting hunched up (Munkamish) in a small house had an old quarrel with a big man in a big house, it was the big man who ought to knock the small man's door. I said that the big man had knocked several times but had not received a welcome. He said they must knock again with fairer words. I said that since I did not represent the IPC I could not discuss the matter but obviously any settlement must be a matter of give and take.

6. I then said he would probably know of the appointment of a new Managing Director of IPC, Mr. Stockwell. He would be taking over from 1 August and it was my understanding that he would want to come as soon as possible to Iraq to talk things over, not least with Saddam himself. Would he welcome this and receive him? He said he was not the right man: oil affairs were handled by a committee consisting, as I would know, of Ammash, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Oil. I said yes, yes, but we all know where decisions are made. Would he receive Mr. Stockwell if he came? He said he would think about this. I also mentioned that Mr. Hahn had been brought back from the ends of the earth three weeks ago because Sheikhly had let it be known that he wanted to see him urgently. He had been waiting ever since. If the Iraqis were genuinely interested in trying again for a settlement, this was a curious way of proceeding.

7. Throughout our conversation Saddam seemed singularly relaxed, quick-witted and serious. He still strikes me as the best hope for this country as long as Ba'athism prevails. It may be worth adding, as a sidelight on the relationship between Saddam and Bakr, that while I was with him the telephone rang. A rough translation of what Saddam said into it would run: "Yes, Mr. President, but I am not convinced. If he is to do the job, there must be no official appointment."

(H.G. Balfour Paul)

10 July, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

(15. 10. 1970)



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(H.G. Balfour Paul)

10 July, 1970

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Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

17

(NEQ 3/548/1).

21 July 1970.

f 15

I have delayed replying to your letter 2/12 of 4 July to Anthony Acland in case some sensational and ill-considered Iraqi action during last week's revolutionary celebrations put into reverse the slight trend towards moderation and common sense in Iraqi attitudes which you have detected (and described in paragraph 4 of your letter). However, as it happens, apart from a warning about Basra Petroleum Company's spare capacity, we appear so far to have escaped unscathed:

2. I agree that if the Iraqis are, however tentatively, seeking a better relationship with us and with other non-Communist countries, it would be good sense for us, in our turn, to hang out more flags. We, of course recognise that Iraq has legitimate interests in the Gulf and, therefore, in the future of the area and that we should take proper account of this when formulating our Gulf policy. I think we can claim to have done so since 18 June, and we shall probably want you to seek Iraqi views on the Gulf again in due course.

3. We have considered your suggestion of extending an official invitation to visit the U.K. to Saddam Hussain al-Tikriti, but do not think the time is ripe (especially from the standpoint of our new Administration) for inviting him to this country just yet. The indicators of a sense of realism and moderation set out in paragraph 4 of your letter need to become a little more numerous before they would look convincing in a submission! However, you can rest assured that we shall strongly recommend that Baghdad should be included in the itinerary of any Minister, or other representative of the Secretary of State who may visit the Gulf during the process of consultation about future policy there.

His Excellency,  
Mr. H. G. Balfour Paul, C.M.G.,  
Baghdad.

- 1 -

CONFIDENTIAL

MM  
23/7





4. We would also recommend that such a visitor took the opportunity to assure the Iraqis that we recognise the legitimacy of their interests in the Gulf and put it to them that it would be helpful for the future stability of the area if Iraq could, at the appropriate time, come out in concert with other riparian powers in open support of the UAE. Even if a joint declaration including the Iranians would be impossible for the Iraqis to subscribe to, a Saudi-Kuwaiti-Iraqi declaration of support for the UAE would be well worth having.

(J. P. Tripp)

c.c. Sir S. Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,  
H.M. Political Resident,  
Bahrain.

W. Morris, Esq., C.M.G.,  
H.M. Ambassador,  
Jedda.

Sir D. Wright, K.C.M.G.,  
H.M. Ambassador,  
Tehran.

S. Falle, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.C.,  
H.M. Ambassador,  
Kuwait.



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Registry

No. NEQ. 3/548/1

**DRAFT**

Letter

Type 1 +

CURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:—

His Excellency,  
Mr. H. G. Balfour Paul, CMG  
BAGHDAD.

From

J. P. Tripp

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

C.C.  
Sir. B. Crawford  
W. Morris, Esq.,  
Sir D. Wright  
S. Falle, Esq.  
*Hussain*

I have delayed replying to your letter 2/12 of 4 July to Anthony Acland in case some sensational ~~and~~ <sup>but</sup> ill-considered Iraqi action during last week's revolutionary celebrations put into reverse the slight trend towards moderation and common sense in Iraqi attitudes which you have detected (and described in paragraph 4 of your letter). However, as it happens, apart from a warning about Basra Petroleum Company's spare capacity, we appear so far to have escaped unscathed:

2. I agree that if the Iraqis are, however tentatively, seeking a better relationship with us and with other non-Communist countries, it would be good sense for us, in our turn, to hang out more flags. We, of course, recognise that Iraq has legitimate interests in the Gulf and, therefore, in the future of the area, and that we should take proper account of this when formulating our Gulf policy. I think we can claim to have done so since 18 June, and we shall probably want you to seek Iraqi views on the Gulf again in due course.

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/yet.

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*Seen by*  
*Mr Acland.*

*Mr Tripp*

*St Eggleston*  
*2/17*



CONFIDENTIAL

W (17)

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 702

TO CAIRO  
9 JULY 1970  
(ARABIAN)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO CAIRO TELEGRAM NUMBER 702 OF 9 JULY  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY KUWAIT JEDDA  
WASHINGTON BAGHDAD UKMIS NEW YORK BAHRAIN AGENCY MUSCAT DOHA ABU  
DHABI DUBAI ADEN KHARTOUM BEIRUT AMMAN TRIPOLI ALGIERS RABAT TUNIS  
RAWALPINDI NEW DELHI PARIS BONN UKDEL NATO MOSCOW TEHRAN BRUSSELS  
AND ANKARA.

POLICY IN THE GULF.

I HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE PRESENCE OF THE SHAH  
IN EUROPE TO PAY A SHORT VISIT TO SEE HIM IN BRUSSELS ON 10 JULY IN  
ORDER TO HAVE A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON A PERSONAL BASIS.  
I HAD ALSO HOPED TO BE ABLE TO SEE KING FAISAL IN GENEVA AND  
SUGGESTED THIS TO THE SAUDIS, BUT IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO  
ARRANGE. THE KING MADE VARIOUS EXCUSES AND IT SEEMS THAT THE SAUDIS  
DO NOT WISH TO BE SEEN TO BE PUBLICLY ASSOCIATED WITH US IN A REVIEW  
OF POLICY. I DO NOT INTEND TO PUT ANY NEW PROPOSALS TO THE SHAH BUT  
MERELY TO START THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION, TO WHICH I ATTACH  
IMPORTANCE, ON HOW BEST TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS SETTLEMENT OF  
DISPUTES WHICH ARE DISTURBING UNITY AND ON THE FUTURE ORGANISATION  
OF SECURITY. I AM OF COURSE EQUALLY KEEN TO HEAR THE VIEWS OF  
ARAB LEADERS.

2. MY BRIEF VISIT TO BRUSSELS WILL BE ANNOUNCED TO-DAY. I WOULD NOT  
WANT THIS TO BE INTERPRETED AS A DRAMATIC INITIATIVE IMPLYING THAT  
I HAVE TAKEN A DECISION ON POLICY OR THAT I AM MAKING SPECIFIC  
PROPOSALS. WITH MODERN COMMUNICATIONS IT IS JUST AS EASY TO GO TO  
BRUSSELS AS IT IS TO MY CONSTITUENCY IN SCOTLAND AND IT SEEMED WRONG  
TO MISS THE OPPORTUNITY OF RENEWING PERSONAL CONTACT WITH THE SHAH  
WHILE HE IS IN EUROPE. NOR DO I WANT THIS VISIT TO CAUSE OFFENCE TO  
OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA OR TO RAISE UNNECESSARY SUSPICIONS  
IN BAGHDAD, ADEN AND CAIRO.

/3.

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- 2 -

3. H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI AND DUBAI MAY THEREFORE EXPLAIN MATTERS TO THE RULERS AND THE AMIR OF KUWAIT AND/OR AT LOWER LEVELS AS MAY BE THOUGHT APPROPRIATE ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 1 WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE THIRD SENTENCE. YOU SHOULD SAY ON A PERSONAL BASIS FROM MYSELF THAT I ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO CONSULTATION WITH ALL THE LEADERS OF THE AREA AND ALTHOUGH UNFORTUNATELY I MAY NOT BE ABLE TO VISIT THEM MYSELF OWING TO THE PRESSURE OF BUSINESS, I GREATLY LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THEIR VIEWS. I WILL THEREFORE BE ASKING H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN THE AREA TO HAVE A FULL DISCUSSION WITH THEM IN THE FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE.

4. I ASSUME THAT THE SULTAN OF MUSCAT WILL NOT SHOW MUCH INTEREST IN OR EVEN MISINTERPRET MY VISIT. H.M. CONSUL-GENERAL MUSCAT MAY, HOWEVER, EXPLAIN MATTERS TO HIM ON A SIMILAR BASIS IF HE THINKS THIS ADVISABLE.

5. H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN CAIRO AND BAGHDAD MAY ALSO INFORM THE FOREIGN MINISTRIES AT THE LEVEL THEY CONSIDER MOST APPROPRIATE OF THE FACTS AND PURPOSE OF MY VISIT, EMPHASISING THAT NO DECISIONS ON POLICY HAVE YET BEEN TAKEN: THAT I DID NOT WISH TO LOSE THE CHANCE OF PERSONALLY HAVING A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE SHAH: BUT THAT MY INTENTION IS TO INFORM MYSELF OF THE VIEWS OF ALL THE LEADERS IN THE AREA (AS STATED IN THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE ON 2 JULY) AND OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS AS A WHOLE BEFORE FORMULATING BRITISH POLICY.

6. H.M. EMBASSY WASHINGTON MAY INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THIS VISIT. I SHALL BE GLAD TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE SHAH'S VIEWS TO MR. ROGERS WHEN I SEE HIM THE FOLLOWING DAY.

7. POSTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES TO WHOM THIS TELEGRAM IS REPEATED MAY, IF ASKED, DRAW ON PARAGRAPH 1 (LESS THE SECOND AND THIRD SENTENCES) IN BRIEFING RELIABLE CONTACTS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

ARABIAN D.  
N.E.D.  
NEWS D.  
N.A.D.  
GUIDANCE D.  
AMERICAN D.  
OIL D.  
MOD (INTERNAL)

COPIES TO:

MR. MOON  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET



1) *Carries Sent 12/10*  
2) *ENTER* *3/9. Fascinating!*  
*Mr. Ingham (2)*  
*Mr. Eaton*  
*NAO*  
*7/9*

(18)



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

29 August, 1970

*10*  
*6/19*

(3/13)

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN	
REGISTRY No. 10	
3	1970
NEQ 3/548/1	

*It seems to be a common Arab trait to believe that all those who are hostile to them must be in*

The Ba'athists and Britain

*There perhaps the Egyptian attitude. R.E. 7/9.*

One of the most curious things I have found on my return from leave is the degree to which people here consider that we are identified with the Ba'athists. We have in the past reported on this rather surprising phenomenon but I have never known the view so widespread.

2. You will no doubt have seen Heikal's weekly article on 21 August in which he alleged that the Iraqi Ba'athists were working for the British:

"There is also Britain's role, which is a suspected role being exercised behind the Iraqi Baath Party. The relationship between the two (Baath Party and Britain) is an open secret in Baghdad, substantiated by facts, names and numbers."

The Syrian information media are also quoted as saying that, whereas the Ba'athists in Iraq claimed to have cracked down on U.S. spies and agents, they had not brought a single British spy or agent to trial and the Damascus paper AL RAYAH dared the Iraqi leaders to take action against British interests in Iraq.

3. The view that we were in cahoots with the Ba'athists has often been expressed to me - and other independent observers - by Iraqis but the same sort of view has been expressed to one or other of us in the last few days by other more eminent people:-

- (a) Abdul Hussain Jamali, the Acting Director-General of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told me on 24 August when I was summoned to see him (my telegrams Nos. 561 and 562) that the Iraqi Government regarded its relations with the U.K. as entirely normal and friendly. He went on to say that they were indeed being criticised both internally and externally for their relations with us. We must have noticed that the Government had prevented the press from

(NER 3/344/1)

/writing

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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writing about us in the same way as they write about the Americans. (Indeed there has been singularly little about us in the press since my return from leave, although we have of course come in for serious criticism from time to time over the last year or so.)

- (b) Major-General Kassab, the former Commander of the Iraqi Air Force and now its Inspector-General, on 25 August told Jake Sharpe, our Defence Attaché, that there were a number of people in the régime who were "British men". He instanced not only General Hardan Tikriti, but also the unsavoury Director-General of Security, Nadhim Kazar.
- (c) Jake Sharpe spoke recently to Brigadier Shawkat, the Egyptian Military Attaché, about the present state of relations between Baghdad and Cairo. Shawkat volunteered that Nasser had always, as we of course know, disliked the Ba'ath Party and one of the principal reasons for this dislike was the Ba'ath's connection with the British.

4. It could be that the present Government itself feels that it needs to demonstrate that it is not collaborating with us and this could be ~~one~~ explanation for the Ministry summoning me over the detained Algerians affair - although the Iraqis have a well-known propensity to interfere with other people's business anyway and they gave the matter no publicity - and for the rather strange manner of conveying the Government's view on the level at which Bill Luce should be received. It could also possibly account for the letters from the Ministry of Oil to IPC about royalty expensing and increased use of facilities to the South. However, I am inclined to think that this is fanciful and that more straightforward explanations are probably correct.

5. I do not think that we need take all this too tragically, but, of course, if the Ba'athist régime here were to be toppled, some of the dislike of them could well rub off on us. Meantime, our allegedly favourable position vis-à-vis the Ba'ath does not make it any easier for us to obtain access to the Government and we still have knotty outstanding issues like the Rogers case.

*Yours Ever*

*D. F. Hawley*

(D. F. Hawley)

Copy to: D.L. Stewart, C.M.G., British Embassy, Cairo.

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The Soviet Union has given a great deal to strengthen the Arab forces but Arab relations are basically different from Israeli-US relations. Relations between the Soviet Union and the Arabs are relations of friendship. They differ from US relations with Israel which are complete physical ties.

What does all this amount to? It amounts to the fact that there are undoubted changes in the current situation. These changes are without any doubt in favour of the Arabs in the current struggle.

But we should hastily add that these changes, while they admittedly exist and are in favour of the Arabs, have not yet reached the level which would create new exigencies compelling the US Secretary of State, or whoever is expressing these changes, to present something new and valuable.

However, I do not wish - nor do I think that I can in a hurried article - jump to conclusions by judging the new Rogers plan or initiative. But what I should like to say frankly and honestly is a reiteration of what I have already said: The changes which have occurred in the situation are not enough to create the exigencies that will achieve what we want. The matter, in the final analysis, will remain dependent on this consideration.

What Rogers says is not important because what he says only expresses the present reality. The main thing is what we can do and what new exigencies we can introduce. We must always remember that diplomatic language does not and cannot reflect anything but the reality on the battlefield. Before reading and analysing this language we must see that the key to the situation is on the front and nowhere else.

Now I shall remove my bag from the Tripoli aircraft and catch the Moscow aircraft.

#### Baghdad Radio on Britain's Middle East Policy

Baghdad home service in Arabic 11.30 GMT 3.7.70

#### Excerpts from commentary:

As soon as the Conservative Party won the recent election in Britain, the promises made by the Conservatives to (?British) Zionists entered the implementation stage... The support that the Conservatives promised to the Zionists stems from the unity of interests and unity of fate linking British imperialism and the Zionist entity in the vital Arab area in which Britain owns interests and positions which cannot easily be given up... The Conservative Government's support for the Zionist presence in Palestine is now even more fundamental for two reasons:

(1) To protect the Zionist presence from the dangers of the Arab revolutionary upsurge, especially after 5th June.

(2) The definite intentions of the Conservatives to maintain the British military presence east of Suez, particularly in the Arabian Gulf, because this presence must be protected on two levels through the presence of the Zionist base in Palestine. The first level is to preoccupy the Arab nation in a war with the Zionists and thus divert it from dealing with the Gulf issue. The other level is to plot against any revolutionary approach to the issue, especially a move by the Iraqi 17th July revolution.

The friendly statements exchanged between London and Tel Aviv culminated with the recent visit of the Zionist enemy Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, to Britain to meet the new British Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home. This visit had a special significance because it was the first between the Zionist and new Conservative

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We take such a look at all the powers affecting and influencing the crisis in the following manner: (1) Egypt: There are definitely considerable changes represented in the brilliant steadfastness of the Egyptian people. It is a positive steadfastness represented in the Egyptian people's ability - with their manpower resources - to provide the biggest and strongest Arab army to stand on the front line. It is also represented in this people's ability - through their productive resources - to finance the major part of the Arab battle. Through energetic political and military action - in which it was helped by the Soviet Union - Egypt has been able to defend its depth to a certain extent against the enemy Air Force. It has also been able to limit the enemy's activities on the Red Sea coast, consequently concentrating the fighting on the [Canal] front. Egypt's ability to attack on this front is still hampered by the enemy's air superiority in which he is helped by supplies from the USA.

In fact, the complex problem on the Egyptian front is now the air defence necessary for the 25-30 km. deep strip of land along the Suez Canal. In this strip - the concentration area for the attack - the enemy is using all his air superiority to disperse the concentration and forestall the attack.

(2) The eastern front: A new thinking emerged in Tripoli last week on this front and stepping up its vital role in the battle. This thinking is still a hope, but the present situation on this front is as follows: 'The Syrian Army is the biggest force on this front. Its role was clearly eminent in last week's battles. But this army operates in very difficult and critical circumstances as Damascus is only 40 km. from the front line.

The Iraqi Army is an important support for the eastern front. In fact, it can be said that the eastern front cannot be fully effective without the Iraqi Army. But for several reasons the role played by the Iraqi Army in the battle has not yet become effective.

The Jordanian Army has been through the valuable experience of reorganisation, but the political atmosphere surrounding it - especially after the recent crisis between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestine Resistance - puts it to a severe test.

The Palestine Resistance has become a force to be reckoned with on the eastern front, but the Palestine Resistance movement in general is suffering from the problem of defending its rear. It is also suffering from the problem of unifying its thinking as well as its actions. Moreover, the conflicts in Jordan and Lebanon have overtaxed its resources and cut its abilities.

Should the hopes entertained in Tripoli materialise, far reaching changes on this front can be expected. But this is still a hope.

(3) Israel: The burden on the Israeli Army is becoming greater and it is continuing to suffer from bloodshed with serious consequences for Israel's special circumstances. The wider deployment of this army is exhausting it, particularly in Sinai. Morale in Israel is low, especially among the youth. The new trend among the youth - as an eyewitness has told me what he saw in Israel - was a shock to the ruling clique in Israel, particularly to the military establishment...

But all this and other things should be looked upon with caution for several reasons. One reason is that Israel's victory in the six-day war is still idealised in Israel. Also, Israeli generations have a firm belief that if they stop fighting they will stop living. Another reason is that the ruling alliance is aware that it cannot maintain its present front without adopting the most extreme and violent attitudes.

We shall now discuss the role of the international parties affecting and influencing the crisis. In addition to the enemy, these are: (4) The USA and its unlimited political, economic and military support to Israel. This state of affairs has brought about only limited reaction on the Arab side. It is true that the USA has lost its political standing in the area. It is also true that US strategic interests in the area are threatened. But it is also true that US economic interests in the area are still untouched and the USA has several backdoor relations in the Arab world.



**Governments.** The visit followed the statements made by the Conservatives, and especially by the Prime Minister, Heath, and the Foreign Secretary, Home, who are eager to strengthen relations with the Zionist occupiers and maintain the British military presence east of Suez.

It is definite that the talks between the two sides were centred on means to escalate British economic, military and propaganda support for the Zionist entity, and on what the Zionist presence could offer British imperialism.

We must note one indication: Eban was met by hostile demonstrations in which Britons and Arabs participated. This indicates increased hostility on the part of the British people to the Zionist occupation in the Arab area.

#### Cairo 'Al-Jumhuriyah' on Nasir's Moscow Talks

Cairo home service in Arabic 04.25 GMT 4.7.70

Text of item from press review:

Under the headline "victory talks", 'Al-Jumhuriyah' says in an editorial: The Moscow talks are characterised by abundant political and military studies of the Middle East situation. The studies are taking place at the highest Arab and Soviet levels. There is no doubt that the principles and bases are clear and known, whether in relation to the permanent and deep friendship or to standing in one front for progress and peace and to confront colonialism and imperialism. The aim is also clear: To achieve peace based on justice in the Middle East and to liquidate the Zionist-imperialist aggression against the Arab peoples.

This means that the long meetings of the sub-committees are directly concerned with studying the best methods and means to achieve the desired aim, whether it be in the political or military field. This study has become necessary because we are in a new struggle phase in which a number of factors have accumulated which stressed that we are proceeding along an open road to liberate the Arab territories and the usurped Arab rights and which emphasise that the aggressive expansionist ambitions of the forces of Zionism and imperialism are facing an impasse.

We can describe the Moscow talks as victory talks for the front of all peace and progress-loving peoples over the forces of aggression and imperialism.

#### 'Al-Ahram' on Pompidou's Middle East Statement

Cairo home service in Arabic 04.25 GMT 4.7.70

Excerpts from item from press review:

Under the headline "A view that seeks justice and realism", 'Al-Ahram' comments on the statement by the French President Georges Pompidou: Pompidou's statement on the Middle East crisis, at his press conference, expressed the facts of the situation more realistically and impartially than did the statement by the US President Nixon, made a few hours earlier. Pompidou's statement came as a reply not just in words but in deeds as well. The French President reaffirmed that France adhered to the policy of banning arms shipments to Israel, explaining that the situation urgently required avoidance of anything that would aggravate it.

It is certain that President Pompidou is right when he stresses that the balance of power in the Middle East is constantly changing to the detriment of Israel. It has also been proved that the French initiative calling on the big-four Powers to discuss a settlement for the crisis could play a role in preventing escalation of the dispute to a hot confrontation between the big States...



The Israeli press has tried to explain Pompidou's position as being adherence to withdrawal of Israeli forces as a basis for a settlement contrary to Nixon's insistence on reaching a settlement before withdrawal. This comparison alone is enough to determine the dividing line between a position that adheres to the principles of justice and seeks the spirit before the letter of contemporary international legitimacy and a position indicating overt bias towards the aggressor which attempts to establish a (?precedent) to justify expansion and occupation of territories by force of arms.

#### Comment on Nixon's Television Statement

(a) Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic 10.30 GMT 3.7.70

Excerpts from commentary by Salah as-Suwayfi:

It appears that the American President is personally leading the American campaign of hostility against the Arab people... President Nixon has said Israel does not wish to drive the Arab countries into the sea, but that the other countries want to drive Israel into the sea. President Nixon's reiteration of Israel's old allegations - which have been exposed and which no longer deceive anyone after Israel itself has committed aggression against the Arabs - is sure evidence of the bankruptcy of American policy and that it is compelled, even at the level of its President, to make propaganda for Israel and reiterate the lies and deceptions which failed together with the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries. True, Israel did not drive the Arabs into the sea, but it drove the Palestinian Arab people into the desert twice, firstly in 1948 and then in 1967, and it is exercising against the rest of them in the occupied territories a policy of annihilation and killing en masse...

Why does President Nixon get involved to such a degree? Firstly, the threats contained in President Nixon's statements against the Arab people and the lies and deceptions about the situation in the Middle East are closely linked with a number of events. The first is the failure of President Nixon's policy of intervening in Cambodia... The second is President Jamal Abd an-Nasir's visit to the Soviet Union and the Arab-Soviet military and political talks on the situation in the Middle East, as an attempt by President Nixon to exert pressure on the Soviet Union, harm Arab-Soviet friendship and try to end Soviet support for the Arabs in their conflict against their enemy. The third, which is also linked with President Nixon's statements, took place a few days ago along the Suez Canal front when the Egyptian air defence system brought down four American Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft. This proves, as senior Israeli army officers have stated, that the UAR has succeeded in building the air defence network in the forward area all along the Canal front in spite of all the attempts made by Israel to prevent this through uninterrupted air raids and bombing in this area.

Secondly, President Nixon warned of confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union and of a nuclear war because of the Middle East events... The American President, Nixon, with such warnings, has returned to the policy of brinkmanship which Mr. Dulles, a former American Secretary of State, pursued in order to drag the world to the brink of a nuclear war...

There is no doubt that the USA's experience in Vietnam, Cambodia and in the Middle East is the best proof of the failure of the policy of strength which the USA is pursuing in confronting the free peoples and the liberation movements, whether this relies on the American forces themselves or other forces such as those of Israel. The USA's policy in the Middle East is doomed to failure even if President Nixon resorts to a policy of threats and intimidation.

As for the Arab-Soviet friendship, events have proved that this is too strong to be affected by American manoeuvres and threats. Moreover the common struggle between the Arabs and the Soviet Union against colonialism in all its forms is founded on a firm basis and a knowledge of all the dimensions of imperialist plans.





Private Secretary

Message to the Iraq Foreign Minister from the Secretary of State

Flag A

Baghdad Radio last night broadcast a statement quoting an official source, to effect that the Iraq Government was appealing to the fedayeen to release the passengers of the hijacked aeroplanes.

Flag B

2. This is a welcome return to sanity by the Iraqis whose Government controlled press, on 8 September, was fulsome in its praise of the hijackings describing them as a blow against the "Imperialist/Zionist alliance".

Flag C

3. Our Charge d'Affaires in Baghdad was summoned to the Iraq Foreign Ministry yesterday and was told by a senior official that the Iraq Government disapproved of hijackings in principle and that they would exert every effort with the fedayeen to obtain the release of all the "civilians" detained in Jordan as a result of the hijackings. The Iraq official confirmed that this meant all passengers and crew irrespective of nationality.

4. As the Iraq Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Karim Shaikhli is still in London (on a private visit) it would be appropriate for us to take the opportunity presented by his presence to express H.M.G.'s approval of the more responsible attitude now being shown by the Iraq Government. This could, perhaps, best be done through a personal message (in writing) from the Secretary of State to Mr. Shaikhli for delivery to the Iraq Embassy under cover of a short letter from you. I submit drafts.

5. Sir P. Adams has seen this draft and agrees.

*Rego to P.M.M.*  
11/9

*P.M.M. Hinchcliffe*  
(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)  
Near Eastern Department  
11 September, 1970

c.c. Emergency Unit  
Sir P. Adams  
Mr. Tripp  
Mr. Renwick  
News Dept.

*Mr Shaikhli has already left London. I have spoken to the Embassy (and written separately) on this. I think the message should go through Baghdad.*

Restricted



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.	<b>DRAFT</b> letter	Type 1 +
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	To:—	From
Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.	His Excellency, Mr. Kadhim M. Kahlaf 21-22 Queen's Gate, S.W.7.	Private Secretary Telephone No. & Ext.
PRIVACY MARKING		Department
.....In Confidence		
<p>I would be grateful if you could deliver the enclosed letter from Sir Alec Douglas-Home to His Excellency Mr. Abdul Karim Shaikhli who <sup>is</sup> still staying with you.</p>		



Registry  
No.**DRAFT** Message

Type 1 +

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
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Unclassified.

To:—

His Excellency,  
Mr. Abdul Karim Shaikhli,  
c/o Embassy of the Republic  
of Iraq,  
21-22 Queen's Gate,  
S.W.7,

From

Sir Alec Douglas-Home

Telephone No. &amp; Ext.

Department

## PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

I have been informed of a statement broadcast by Baghdad Radio last night quoting an official source as saying that your Government has been in contact with the fedayeen organisations asking them to release those detained in the recent hijacking incidents.

2. This has been confirmed by our Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad who was told by one of your senior officials that this report reflected the attitude of your Government which is now working for the release of all passengers and crew, irrespective of nationality, and that similar messages were being conveyed to the representatives in Baghdad of those countries which are members of the Security Council.

3. I would just like to say how much I welcome this positive step which your Government has taken towards obtaining the release of the victims of the hijackings which will, I am sure, be a significant contribution towards a speedy solution of this most distressful affair.



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From 1967 to 1970 US policy preferred to leave the crisis alone and to leave the parties to face each other. As a result of Israel's 1967 victory itself and as a result of continuous US support for the Israeli forces, the situation was in our enemy's favour, so the United States had nothing to lose from the continuation of the crisis. Indeed, it had everything to gain. Then came 1970 and with it came additional Soviet support. The crisis began to take on a new shape foretelling danger... But in all fairness the basic factor which influenced the US political move was the Soviet military move. The Soviet military move raised the temperature of the conflict.

Egypt's acceptance of what has been termed the US initiative in fact tended to keep the crisis at this high temperature. Egypt's point of view in brief was as follows: If the United States, facing the danger of a confrontation, manages to press Israel to accept the implementation of the Security Council resolution, this is well and good. If not, this move will not introduce anything that was not there already.

The US intention was to stop the escalation of the conflict so it would not lead to incalculable complications.

But the important question still remains before us: Does this mean that the United States has changed its outlook or methods or what it seeks in this crisis? The facts refute such speculation. In international politics there simply cannot be such a change in basic attitudes.

Egypt did not change its basic attitude when it accepted the US initiative. Neither has the United States changed its basic attitude by putting forward its initiative...

A final question arises here at the end of this long journey around the US role in the crisis today: What can be behind US policy while the initiative still stands? Most likely, in pursuit of the same aims, the United States strives for the following:

(a) Stopping the escalation of the crisis might lead to a state of relaxation which might affect the close link of the Soviet Union with the crisis. When this happens the temperature of the crisis would fall, as a first step, to be followed by others which might affect the role of the Soviet Union in the crisis - a major US aim.

(b) While the escalation of the crisis is being checked the opportunity might arise to restore Israel's former image, the small threatened Israel instead of the Israel of daily savage aggressions...

(c) Egypt's acceptance of the US initiative might lead to disintegration in the Arab world. This is a continuation of an old US aim but in different circumstances.

(d) A swift Egyptian move might give an opportunity that would make it easier to strike Egypt.

One need only listen to London radio implicitly denouncing Egypt's political move and implicitly praising all those in the Arab world who have dared to defy Egypt's attitude. The Iraqi Ba'th Party attitude is directly connected with this. That Party's attitude comes within the sphere of British action in the area...

In brief, nothing has changed. What has happened is that the clash has been turned from an open conflict into a hidden conflict and from a negative conflict into a positive one and this is harsher and more violent.

#### Baghdad Radio on British Policy in the Middle East

Baghdad home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 11.9.70

Text of commentary:

Anyone who follows British policy in the Arab region finds that this policy today does not differ in aims and methods from what it used to be in both the recent and



distant past. Britain wanted and still wants the Arab homeland as a market for her products, a source of raw materials for her industries, a base for maintaining her influence in other regions in Asia and Africa, and a safe road for protecting her trade. Britain has endeavoured and is still endeavouring to use the resources of the Arab homeland, its geographical location, and its manpower as a weapon in the secret war between her and her Western allies, and in the open war between her and the socialist camp and the other forces of progress the world over.

Consecutive British Governments have adopted many means for realising these aims. These used to range, and are still ranging, between direct military occupation, as was the case in Libya, Egypt, Iraq and the Sudan, and as is the case today in the Arabian Gulf and the South, and the setting up of Governments which carry out the orders and objectives of British policy, no matter what these objectives may be and how far removed they may be from the interests of the Arab people. This was the case in the Iraqi region prior to the 14th July revolution, and as is now the case in many parts of the Arab homeland. Not long ago Britain embarked on a unique method of maintaining her political and economic interests - the establishment of the racist Zionist base in Palestine and its provisioning with the various means which are likely to make it a factor in breaking up the Arab effort, a big obstacle against the establishment of Arab unity, and a bayonet to stab any liberation movement.

In addition to the methods mentioned above, Britain has used other methods. Just by way of example, we mention Britain's establishment of an effective intelligence apparatus, based on her agents in the region, to break up the ranks of the people and arouse racial, sectarian and tribal feelings in order to prevent the unity of the masses and to divert their attention to side-issues and away from the path leading to deliverance. Noteworthy is the fact the Britain, unlike many of her allies, tried in recent years to avoid an open clash with the forces of the Arab revolution, and consequently responded to the development of Arab awareness and the growth of the forces of liberation in the region. In order to realise this - to realise the transformation from open to concealed confrontation - Britain declared its desire to withdraw militarily from the Arabian Gulf at the beginning of the seventies. She also tried to appear neutral with regard to the Arab-Zionist conflict.

In this Britain was endeavouring to absorb the Arab wrath and indignation against the Western States which supported the Zionists in the 5th June aggression, and to avoid what might harm her political and economic interests as a result of Arab reaction. No sooner was Britain able to emerge safely from the crisis of violent conflict between the Arabs and the West during the past three years than she went back to practising the policy of open confrontation. She cancelled the plan for withdrawal from the Arabian Gulf and insisted on maintaining her military presence there. She also supplied the Zionists with large quantities of weapons. She stood by them in international contexts. She was a big partner in the attempts at a peaceful solution which resulted, in Rogers plan.

Britain's attitude to the fida'i action, the campaign of savage oppression by the British authorities in the Protectorates and the Arabian Gulf, and Britain's stubbornness towards the nationalist demands for the liberation of national resources are matters which reaffirm that the hostile attitude adopted by Britain towards the Arab people is still there, and that it represents the essence of British policy in the Arab region. But we would like to remind the British politicians that the Arab people will no longer be deceived after today by tricks of international policy and that this people is determined to liberate its land from any (?occupation).



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15/9/70

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This policy is germane to Britain's colonialist history, and particularly its history in this Arab area. The areas of the southern Arabian Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf have been acquainted with it since British colonialism set foot in them. The story, in its recurrent chapters over one and a half centuries, is well known, and hardly requires further explanation or detailed discussion. Although we are now in the 1970s, and although things keep changing and developing, Britain still preserves her old style and does not wish to change it.

Britain now wants to stay on in the Arabian Gulf area, in spite of the previous announcement by the Labour Government early in 1968 on wanting to withdraw. Britain, however, cannot find a pretext to justify her continued presence except the old excuse, namely, that there are rulers who want her presence and call on her to stay on. But Britain is forgetting or disregarding the fact that the Arab people today are aware and vigilant, that the Arab people are conscious both of their own affairs and of the events taking place around them, that they know Britain and her tricks, and that they will not allow her to stay on in their land, whatever the motives for this and whatever the pretexts and excuses she advances for this.

Even the rulers and governments of today have altered their views of authority and of the basis of such authority. They may realise that today's Britain is different from the Britain of yesterday; that Britain today cannot for long control the current of events, and that real power stems from, or should stem from, within the area, from the vigilant people of the area, from its vast resources, its important geographical position, its Arabism and aspirations for progress, its links with the Arab nation and the great homeland. These facts about the area are the belief of all; everyone knows them to be definite truths which will dominate the current of events, however assiduously Britain tried to retain her forces in the area, in spite of the will of the area's people, and, indeed, however cleverly Britain uses pretexts of responding to wishes from within the area. For the area does not want Britain to stay on, and the people want nothing less than liberty, power and dignity.

(c) Baghdad home service in Arabic 11.30 GMT 13.9.70

Excerpts from "Political Inquiry" programme:

A few days ago Britain's envoy, Luce, completed his month-long mission in the Arabian Gulf during which he had in complete secrecy what were described as consultations and negotiations about the future of the Arabian Gulf. Upon his return to London, the British press began to speak about a change in British strategy from the earlier decision by the British Conservatives not to withdraw the British troops from the Arabian Gulf, to withdrawal coupled with the maintenance of military air bases such as those in Sharjah and Muscat and Oman. Thus the British imperialists would pretend to be withdrawing while actually guaranteeing their presence in the area not only through the air and military bases, but also by tightening the grip of their imperialist influence on the area with the help of other imperialist forces.

We are not astonished to note that the imperialist and agent trumpets began to talk about the future of the Arabian Gulf and that dubious contacts and activities in the area became very active at the same time as Rogers presented his plan for the liquidation of the Palestine question... The Rogers plan aims not only at the liquidation of the Palestine question, but also at the liquidation of the entire Arab liberation movement and the Arab revolution, the destruction of the genuine Arab revolutionary progressive regimes, and the imposition of submission on the whole Arab people... But the 17th July revolution stands firm against all the liquidation designs and plots, not only against the Palestine question but also against the Arabian Gulf Emirates where attempts are being made to stamp out their Arab character by the creation of a new Israel there...



**A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL****Cairo and Baghdad Comment on Britain's Gulf Policy****(a) Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic 16.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula") 12.9.70****Excerpts from talk by Sa'id Imarah:**

Since it took office, the British Conservative Government, known for its colonialist tendency, has been trying hard to create justifications for retaining the British forces now stationed along and across the Amirates of the Arabian Gulf. Britain sent her envoy, William Luce, to the area to feel the pulse of the Rulers of the Arab Amirates and ascertain their views. Britain hopes to find someone who will agree to the retention of British forces and the maintenance of occupation for a further indefinite period...

With her veiled technique and crooked policy, Britain is trying hard to plunder the wealth of the area and monopolise its economic resources. What can be done and what technique should be adopted towards the British attitude and the problems which Britain is creating at this stage? There is no alternative to a federation of all the Arab Amirates and unified action announcing the establishment of a unified State - a State embracing all the Arab Amirates within one frame... Such a federation and such a unity demand a sincere and earnest effort from all the people of the area, who should then announce their rejection of Britain's plans and policy...

**(b) Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic 16.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula") 13.9.70****Text of talk by Sa'd Ghazal:**

British policy is trying to find, in one way or another, a pretext for retaining British forces in the Arabian Gulf area for as long as possible, provided this is done ostensibly in response to a desire expressed by the area itself for the retention of these forces. In this case, the British presence would not be imposed, but would appear as a friend offering services, or whatever it can do, on demand.

This British method is old and well known. It is a distinctive quality of British policy, it is a method which Britain has been practising throughout her long colonialist history in various parts of the world. Britain used to interfere in a given area by invading and occupying it, on the pretext that she was only seeking to protect it in response to a demand made by this or that ruler. Rulers, even those who did in effect ask for Britain's intervention, were put by Britain, from the start, in unnatural circumstances and were thus compelled to make such demands either for her intervention or for her staying on. It used to appear to a ruler that Britain alone had granted him power, that she alone could bestow authority or deny it. Thus Britain could create a condition of continued attachment to her by governments, and Rulers in particular, as well as continued insistence on her presence. That presence would, indeed, become the only guarantee for the survival of their rule. To underline this idea, Britain used to resort to force in putting pressure on those in power and in dictating certain conditions to them in the name of advice and counsel. Such counsels were imposed by protection and consultation treaties, as well as other treaties, which were themselves concluded by force, or were imposed by the British military presence itself, even without written treaties, whatever the legal character of these.



CONFIDENTIAL

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EXTENT OF  
CONJUGATION ~~Barred~~  
SOSFCA M. M. Alamy  
on 3 September 1970



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*M. Alphonse  
said that French  
relations with  
Iraq were not bad.*

*Regg.  
Please check  
Date of the  
communication.*

*AMM  
22.9  
14 3 September 1970*

*P. AMM  
7/1*

situation restored by the withdrawal of the SAMs which had been moved. Mr. Hayman said that this could happen but it was perhaps more likely that the Israeli Government would use the situation to justify a decision not to send Mr. Tekoah back to New York to take part in talks which were being conducted on a basis which they did not like and that they would only take up the talks again when Mr. Eban himself went to New York.

9. On the situation in Jordan, Mr. Hayman said that we would be interested to see the French proposals for some form of Four-Power declaration; we might follow the Americans in speaking to the Soviet Government but were unlikely to make direct representations in Baghdad.

10. Sir Denis Greenhill said that it might be useful to review possible developments in the more distant future. If Dr. Jarring succeeded, there would be a different sort of situation for us to deal with in the Middle East but it was unlikely to be an easy situation. The Russians had established their position in the area and were likely to remain a strong influence there. The "progressive" Governments, like those in Syria and Iraq, would remain difficult ~~for us~~ to deal with. There would remain a need for the influence of <sup>all</sup> European countries to be actively applied.

(French P.U.S.)  
11. Mr. Alphonse agreeing, said that there were many common interests in the area, for example in Iraqi oil, where French and British interests were concentrated in the I.P.C. The French Government wanted to settle the /difficult

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They (the French)  
wrote the cooperation  
for North  
Russia.

difficult problems with Iraq over oil as soon as possible. They had information that the Iraqis were in a mood to settle. It might be possible to increase production in <sup>existing</sup> present fields and so to increase royalties. But it was not of course a governmental negotiation, although governments could exert pressures on the Company.

12. Sir Denis Greenhill said that the British oil companies had come to the conclusion that any settlement which was likely to be acceptable to Iraq would do such violence to their arrangements elsewhere in the Arab world that the balance of advantage lay in not settling. This was bad from the political point of view but the British Government did not feel justified in pressing the companies further.

M. Alphand remarked that the positions of the two Governments were apparently similar but, whereas the French oil companies (and possibly the Shell Company too) stood with the Government, the British partners in I.P.C. took a different view. The Americans were also very reluctant to settle.

13. Invited to speak about Russian policy in the Middle East, Sir Thomas Brimelow said that he assumed that, when the <sup>Russians</sup> Soviet Union agreed to the establishment of the State of Israel, the ~~Russians~~ calculated that this would cause trouble. When the trouble came, they had exploited it and Egypt had been supplied with arms. The Canal was closed. When it was opened, the Russians were likely to exploit the situation again and to expand their influence both in the <sup>Red Sea</sup> ~~immediate~~ area and also into the

Indian Ocean.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



RECEIVED  
REGISTRY No. 10  
- 2 OCT 1970

NEQ 3/548/1

25

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND THE  
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT HELD AT THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION  
ON WEDNESDAY, 23 SEPTEMBER, 1970 AT 10.30 a.m.

Political Affairs

I called on Sayyid Anwar Al Hadithi, the Minister of Transport on 23 September, and it rapidly became plain that he was more interested in talking politics than economics and we had a useful discussion for about three quarter's of an hour.

2. The Minister referred to the serious situation in the Middle East. He strongly criticised the Syrian action in invading Jordan and said it was intolerable that the armed forces of one Arab State should be fighting those of another. He considered Syrian action totally irresponsible particularly in view of the dangers created by the possibility of Israeli or U.S. intervention. He described the situation in Jordan itself as a great calamity, but said it was Iraqi policy not to become involved. The best solution would be for the King to dismiss the military government and reinstall a civilian government. He was doubtful whether even this would now be sufficient to satisfy the commandos in view of the scale of the Royalist action against them. He therefore tended to doubt whether the King would be able to survive.

3. In discussing Anglo/Iraqi relations the Minister said that they were "tolerably good". In fact Nasser accused the Ba'athists of being too friendly with us. If only the I.P.C. dispute could be settled this would lead to greatly improved



- 2 -

relations. As for our general policy on the Middle East this was now regarded by the Iraqis as moderate and sensible.

4. The Minister, if I understood him correctly, confessed that he was not now very close to those who made Party and Governmental decisions. I found this somewhat surprising as I thought that he was fairly close to General Ammash. However, he went on to ask "as a friend" what my view of the internal situation was. After expressing some doubt as to how well the settlement with the Kurds was progressing I said that the Government appeared to have done some sensible things in the economic planning sphere and seemed to be making some sound empirical decisions on specific matters, e.g. Parsons Power Gas. I inferred from his manner that he did not entirely agree with what I had said about sensible economic decisions. I also said, <sup>echoing</sup> / from something which he had said, that the Government appeared to me to be strong. I then asked him what his own view of the internal situation was. He replied that Iraq appeared to be isolated and was under hostile attack by Nasser, the Syrians and the Lebanese press. It was an unsatisfactory situation and internally the régime had had its difficulties with the communists.

5. I then asked the Minister for his advice on a personal basis about what could be done about Mr. Rogers. He expressed strong disapproval of the manner in which Mr. Rogers had been treated and volunteered that "they" - by which I took him to mean some responsible people in the Ministry of Works and Housing, tended to treat Iraqi contractors in the same cavalier manner. He advised me to see the Minister of Works and Housing and then to



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

General Amash. I asked him if he thought he could mention the matter himself, but he said it would be preferable if I did this myself.

(D. F. HAWLEY)

H. of C.  
1st Sec. (B)  
D.A.

✓  
c.c. Mr. Tripp,  
Near Eastern Department,  
P.C.O.

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REGISTRY No. 10

- 2 NOV 1970

NEQ 3/548/1

Mr. C.T. Brant, Oil Department

Thank you.

Mr. Tynan : p. 122 Mr. Macpherson.  
Mr. MakinsonThe Morgan IFC informed.  
There is also the  
possibility of the line of  
credit.Of 27  
x


M 30/1+

Iraq/U.K. relations

In your minute of 20 October you asked whether, in the context of IPC's recent offer (a loan of £20 m.) and the Iraqi government's favourable reaction, it was not possible for H.M.G. to make some parallel gesture to reinforce the better atmosphere now created.

2. I am sceptical of the Iraqi's ability or willingness to be more friendly, but I think there is nevertheless room for a slightly more forthcoming attitude on our part. Perhaps a ministerial visit : or alternatively the P.U.S. might call on the Iraqi Ambassador to say that he was gratified to see that the Iraqi government had decided (as it seems they have decided) to grant Mr. Rogers, a British engineer, an exit visa. In the latter case we should wait to confirm that Mr. Rogers has actually reached the U.K.

3. Whatever gesture (if any) we make we should let Sir Denis Wright know of our intention to make it.



(D.J. Makinson)  
Near Eastern Department  
27 October, 1970

Mr. Hinchcliffe

MM 2/11.

Reg &amp; pa

Jm 2/11

now see  
"line of credit"  
file to  
very line of  
credit as  
a "gesture"  
by HMG.



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Reference ML

*Mr Macpherson*

*A brief comment is needed on £6 overdraft. My view is the Iraqis need to handover Rogers before any gesture can be considered.*

Mr. Ellingworth

Mr. Tammell

Iraq/IPC Relations

Mr. Macpherson gave me an account, this morning, of his and Mr. Stockwell's recent discussions in Iraq.

2. At their initial meeting with Hammadi and Ammash on the morning of 12 October, the Company representatives made an offer of a £15 million advance (or loan) repayable within one year. The Iraqi Ministers then dilated on the reasons why this was not enough. Mr. Stockwell therefore raised the Company's offer to £20 million, repayable over three years.

3. The discussion then turned to the question of the Basra offtake. Mr. Stockwell offered a rate of 21 m.t.a. by the fourth quarter of this year, rising to 28 m.t.a. early in 1971.

4. At the same time, Mr. Macpherson told me, in strict confidence, that Mr. Stockwell then went on to offer an increase of 7¢ per barrel from Basra offtake and 6¢ on Mediterranean offtake (over and above the recent increase in posted prices for Mediterranean grades of crude). This would represent an increase fully equivalent to the introduction of royalty expensing rates. The Iraqi Ministers had wanted to go on to talk about the "floor", below which IPC revenues would be guaranteed not to fall. However, the IPC representatives declined to pursue this line of enquiry, as leading directly into a discussion of the main outstanding issues between the two sides.

5. On 13 October an agreement was signed with the Iraqis to cover the loan/advance, and the offtake guarantee. The Iraqis were clearly pleased and the message was received that General Ammash would like to have them to dinner. This in itself was a fairly significant gesture, since apparently no IPC representatives have been formally entertained by the Iraqi leadership since the Ba'ath took office. In the event, however, the problems connected with the removal of General Tikriti were clearly occupying the leadership, and ~~clearly~~ the invitation could not be made good before the IPC representatives had to leave for home.

6. Mr. Macpherson asked me whether there were any "political" gesture which H.M. Government could make at the present moment to re-enforce the better atmosphere he thought had been created by the IPC's offers. The Soviet Ambassador had been recalled, clearly for a reappraisal of /Soviet

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Soviet Middle East policy following President Nasser's death; and it would be a good moment now for H.M. Government to take the lead from the Russians for once. I undertook to discuss this within the Office and let him know of any conclusions we reached. Perhaps, therefore, NED could brief us on this point.

7. This seems as good as it goes so far. I understand that Mr. Sutcliffe of BP is critical of the decision to advance the Iraqis money before IPC has any assurance of satisfaction on the main issues in dispute. But since the Iraqis have long been urging us and the Company that if a satisfactory earnest of the IPC's good intentions were forthcoming, the Iraqi attitude would change materially, the next step seems to be for us to discuss within the Office and then with other interested Departments where we go from here as regards our paper war with the Iraqis over the IPC. In the (presumably) better atmosphere resulting from Mr. Stockwell's visit, it would seem out of place for us to continue the remonstrances which we have previously been addressing to Governments of offending companies. But this is a point which we can only establish after further discussion with the IPC.

*C.T. Brant*

(C.T. Brant)  
Oil Department  
20 October, 1970.

c.c. Mr. Egerton, NED  
Mr. Cowling, Mintech  
Mr. Gordon, Treasury  
Mr. Ashwood, BOT



J. P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
LONDON S.W.1.



CONFIDENTIAL

*With the compliments of*

~~THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR~~

Mr. D. F. Hawley  
Chargé d'Affaires

Ref. 3/3

*Re  
Ann  
7/10*

*6  
1.10  
Mr. [unclear]*

BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD

*ente  
(Cairo)*

*NTB*

*Reu*

*[Signature]*

*Anglo Iraqi  
relations file*

*+ copy sent  
Roberts file,  
8/10*

24 September, 1970

*1/10*



We are reassured about facing this challenge because we saw our great people moving calmly, confidently, and efficiently last month. We are reassured by our safe transition from a stage in which Jamal Abd an-Nasir was among us to a stage in which we find ourselves without him in a manner - as Anwar as-Sadat put it - which reflects the nobleness of a civilisation whose age is engraved on rock as 7,000 years.

The real test has not yet begun. It is coming. Its front will be broader and more comprehensive than we can visualise. The test will be a political, economic, military, and psychological confrontation. We must be ready when the confrontation comes.

How I wish we could move ahead of this confrontation, take the initiative ourselves, move and assume our responsibilities, and go forth and attain our objectives.

What we have done so far has been splendid. What we shall do henceforth must be even more splendid.

#### Baghdad 'Al-Jumhuriyah' on British Foreign Policy

Baghdad home service in Arabic 06.00 GMT 30.10.70

Excerpts from morning press review:

Under the headline "Our Arab people will foil the attempts to reactivate collapsing British imperialism", 'Al-Jumhuriyah' today writes: It was clear that after taking over power in Britain the Conservative Party would try to realise the dreams of the imperialist die-hards and capitalists by putting life into collapsing British imperialism, defending what remained of British spheres of influence and interests in the world, following a policy more subservient to US imperialist plans and measures, and strengthening the position of British imperialism in NATO on the grounds that the latter is a striking force protecting imperialist interests in general.

Despite the fact that Britain is suffering from an acute economic crisis, which is one of the periodic crises of the capitalist world, and despite the fact that the British people are suffering from suffocating living conditions and are always asking for cuts in military expenditure, the Conservative Government, in order to demonstrate its imperialist arrogance, has increased its military expenditure in the 1971 Budget and referred this increase particularly to what it used to call East of Suez.

This shows its malicious intentions. In the first place, they aim at preserving Britain's imperialist interests there with a threatening gesture, indicating that it is able to exercise the duty of a policeman through its agents and agent States in the area. They are to also show that the British Conservative Government regime is different from the Labour regime. It intends to consolidate and strengthen its intruding forces in the area rather than withdraw them...

Undoubtedly this serious step taken by the imperialist British Government in an attempt to challenge the will of the people by exercising a worn-out policy left over by the dilapidated British Empire can never be compatible with the present age and the colossal resources and increasing power of the progressive forces of the world. Therefore, this Government will clash with the revolutionary forces in the area and entangle itself in a dispute from which it can gain nothing. Its empty pretence that it can play a major role in easing the burden of US imperialism will also be of no avail.

P.O. P  
Tamm  
3/11



Regarding the Arabian Gulf, imperialism's attempts to consolidate its presence and strengthen its shaky positions by collecting agents and supporting the regime of the Shah - who has ambitions in the Gulf Emirates, is plotting against its Arabism, and is strongly attached to the world imperialist wagon - coupled with the brandishing of swords and flexing of muscles, will only prompt our Arab people led by their revolutionary vanguards to continue relentlessly the fight and intensify it. They will do this because of the increase in the imperialists' ferocity, the seriousness of the situation, and the attempts aimed at opening a new Arab front to preoccupy the Arabs and distract them from their fateful battle against imperialism. This is a part of the multilateral imperialist plan for weakening the Arab forces and squandering their various resources...

With all its material resources and means of death and destruction, the United States is facing one defeat after another in its battles against peoples. It is trying in vain to free itself from its entanglements. Aged and decrepit Britain, which has dropped to the rear ranks since the second world war, cannot get rid of its collapsing imperialist spirit. It is trying to reanimate this spirit in the 20th century - the century of peoples and the age of liberation and emancipation. If it wishes to try direct aggression, Britain will have no better luck than the United States in Vietnam and Cambodia.

#### Muhammad Uruq on Britain's Gulf Policy

Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic 17.00 GMT "Arabian Peninsula" 30.10.70

Text of commentary by Muhammad Uruq:

Britain's withdrawal from the Arabian Gulf region in 1971 must not once again become a subject for bargaining so as to allow Britain to find what she can rely on to justify postponing this withdrawal or dropping it indefinitely. Regardless of the motives that prompted Britain under the Labour Government to declare her intention of evacuating the Arabian Gulf on this date, this pledge means that Britain has finally decided to leave the region to its inhabitants to decide of their own free will the future of their homeland. It was obvious to Britain that the masses of the Arab nation viewed this proclamation with suspicion - and rightly so in view of the tricks and manoeuvring of British policy in its breaking of pledges and promises. Thus it was expected that Britain would pretend to leave the region after having prepared for her return in a different form and under a misleading disguise which would allow British ambitions to be realised.

It appears that Britain - now that new efforts to postpone her withdrawal from the region are discernible - prefers to (?uncover) her true face without any ambiguity and stress her determination to ignore her pledge, on the pretext that the rulers of the region have not yet agreed on the shape of relations between their Emirates because of obstructions in the project for establishing the Emirates Federation. What is serious in Britain's efforts is that she is seeking other justifications from within the region itself to justify her recourse to staying and continuing the occupation of the Arabian Gulf; in doing so she is making use of mutual interests that persist between her and some other parties.

Because of this the masses of the Arab nation attach the utmost importance to the continuing efforts to realise the Federation of Gulf Emirates in such a shape as will secure the interests of the region, (?cement) its independence, and unite its campaign for the future. The Federation of the Arabian Gulf Emirates is demanded by the masses, especially since the Arab masses have a clear idea of unity which responds to the general national (Arabic: qawmi) demand and which is in line with the comprehensive campaign for the unity of the whole Arab nation. Furthermore a single step on the road towards building a modern State in the region is bound to protect the Emirates against foreign ambitions and to deny colonialism any of the justifications it is trying to cling to for postponing its withdrawal from the region.



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REGISTRY NO. 10

31 OCT 1970

NEQ3/648/1

May I see r/s, pl?

These rumours will be  
given a vast fillip by events  
British Embassy,  
BAGHDAD, on the IPC  
front, I guess!

31 October, 1970

Reference: 3/13

Dear Richard

I read John Phillips' letter of 15 October to Peter Tripp  
and the enclosed Record of Conversation between Strachan and  
Ali Abu Nuwar, with great interest.

2. We too are intrigued by the pervading suspicion of some  
"dark liaison between H.M.G. and the Iraqis". It is, of course,  
a familiar myth. In his letter 3/13 of 29 August to Peter Tripp,  
Donald Hawley reported a further crop of illustrations (copy  
enclosed for Amman). I have always assumed that, when  
propagated publicly, the myth is designed to annoy the Iraqis  
(as in the case of Heikal's article of 21 August) and that, when  
expressed privately, it reflects the inability of critics of  
this régime to understand how on earth it could stay in power  
without powerful external backing, Britain for historical reasons  
being identified as the backer. Neither of these two explanations  
seem quite to fit the present instance, though I suppose that  
Ali Abu Nuwar, as a Nasserist (if he still is), might be  
expected to echo Heikal's views; and paragraph 10 of  
Strachan's minute is perhaps relevant.

3. I recall, for what it is worth, a curious conversation with  
Hammoud, the Jordanian Ambassador here, last July. He called  
unexpectedly at my house and walked up and down the garden with  
me fervently begging me to use Britain's "visibly increasing  
influence" in Iraq to stop these wild men doing stupid things. I  
suppose it is just possible that he has been reporting his  
fanciful assessment of our standing here to his Government -  
though he seemed to think it a good sign, dexter rather than  
sinister.

Anyway I hope we need not be deterred in our endeavours to  
improve relations with Iraq by the fear that any modest progress  
we might achieve will be held against us by our friends.  
Mutatis mutandis this applies particularly at present to the  
renewed endeavours of the I.P.C. to reach an understanding with  
Iraq.

Yours ever

Spencer

(H. G. Balfour Paul)

Mr. R. M. Evans,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
LONDON S.W.1.

Copied to: H.M. Representatives in  
Amman and Cairo.

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Mr Egey  
Mr. Threlkeld  
Mr. Long

On 9/11  
O. J. Depi shawee.

Enc. R.E. 5/11

Regy attached volume

in para 1+2 & relevant to

Mr Egey  
OR 10/11





BRITISH EMBASSY,  
AMMAN.

*Mr. Logg 26/10*  
*(with apologies for the delay)*

15 October, 1970

Dear Sir,

*Enig. R.E. 24/10.*  
*& copy R.E. D.*  
*done*

---

I enclose the record of a most interesting conversation this week between Ben Strachan and Ali Abu Nuwar, in which Ben made some useful points as well as getting the views of this highly intelligent if erratic figure. I do not myself hold much brief for Ali, and he has a lot of enemies, but he is well-informed, and is even being tipped in some quarters (including his own! as Prime Minister in the not too distant future. We are intrigued by the persistence of the belief in some kind of dark liaison between H.M.G. and the Iraqis; Ali Abu Nuwar is by no means the only source here from which we get hints of this. I also find Ali's views on the future of the Fedayeen (paragraph 8) interesting and credible, but then I want to believe them.

*Yours etc,*

*John*

(J.F.S. Phillips)

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

Copies to H.M. Representatives:

Cairo  
Washington  
Baghdad  
Tel Aviv  
Jedda  
Kuwait  
Moscow

*Mrs. Beckett*

*GM*

*82/11*

*2/11*

*3/11*

*4/11*

*① NE/10 Copy*

*② R/M. Wh*

*③ Mr. Hinch*

*④ Mr. Mark*

*⑤ Alka Dept*

*⑥ NAD/pan 7*

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I called on Ali Abu Nuwar at his home yesterday afternoon. We had an hour's talk until he had to leave for an appointment with Kamal Adwan who was to take him to see Arafat. He asked me to keep this confidential.

2. Nuwar said that the recent confrontation had been most unfortunate. He was sure the King had not wanted it. Did I think it could have been avoided? I said that I thought things had reached such a stage that it had become inevitable. I had always had the impression that the King saw no advantage in a confrontation so long as he was not in a position to offer his people an honourable settlement with Israel. I thought he had always hoped that the mainstream fedayeen i.e. Fateh and their associates, would discipline the extremist groups. Unfortunately some of the activities of the King's loyal supporters had given Fateh the impression that he was out to smash them and this course had had the effect of making all the fedayeen groups close their ranks. Nuwar entirely agreed. We had got into a vicious circle of lack of confidence: because the fedayeen did not trust the King they had brought in large stocks of arms to Amman. This had made the King believe they were seeking to overthrow him and he had taken precautions which in turn had served further to increase fedayeen mistrust. I asked if Nuwar saw any way in which confidence could be established. He believed that once a formal agreement was signed, which would be endorsed by a majority of the heads of Arab states, this should give the fedayeen confidence because, he had pointed out to the fedayeen, were the King to break the agreement he would have to answer to the heads of state who of course included those who provided finance under the Khartoum Agreement. Nuwar said that the two main points the Central Committee were still sticking on were the release of all prisoners and the dismissal of the military

/members

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members of the Government. He would tell them that the prisoners would certainly be released and that there was no need to delay signature on that account. As regards the military ministers there would be no question of the King picking scapegoats, once one started that then the King might demand scapegoats from the fedayeen. Furthermore the choice of ministers was an internal matter for Jordan and no concern of the Central Committee. In any case, the ministers concerned had had no part in formulating policy. Nuwar hinted that the King would in fact be making changes but would wait until it was clear he was not doing so under duress.

### American policy

3. Nuwar said he was convinced the Americans had pressed the King to try and smash the fedayeen. What did I think? I said I had no idea. If they had, they had not confided in us. Speaking personally, I was convinced that American intentions towards the Arabs were much more friendly than the Arabs believed. American policy was not Israeli policy. Russian support for the Arabs, particularly Egypt, was a complicating factor for them since they had been manoeuvred into a position where to meet Arab demands could be represented, particularly by pro-Israeli commentators, as backing down in the face of Soviet pressure and this was something President Nixon could not do.

### Background to the confrontation

4. Nuwar alleged that he and a number of other political leaders spent the night up at the Palace a day or two before the confrontation. Various leaders gave tough advice, but when the King then asked them if they would form a government to carry out their advice, they had each backed down except for Nuwar who had undertaken to form a government provided that he were given a free hand in doing so and could count on the King's full backing for whatever steps he decided to take. The King then left him while he wrote down his list of ministers but when he re-joined the King he found that the

/others

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others had dissuaded him from appointing Nuwar. Nuwar then went home in disgust and the luckless Mohammed Daoud was propelled into the hot seat. Nuwar felt extremely sorry for him.

### Iraq

5. Nuwar said he understood we had good relations with Iraq. Primed by First Secretary's warning that the Palace were suspicious of our relations with Iraq, a warning reinforced by Nuwar's elaborate casualness when asking, I said this was news to me. While I did not follow events in Iraq very closely, I had the impression that our relations with the Iraqis were very bad, much worse than, for example, our relations with Egypt. This shook him and he replied "But what about your mutual oil interests?". I said that when last I heard about those our oil relations were worst of all! Nuwar then asked who had influence with the Iraqis. I said that since Iraqi foreign policy appeared to be to make as many enemies as possible, presumably for internal reasons, I could think of no one except perhaps the Soviet Union. Nuwar said he doubted whether the Soviet Union had very much influence, certainly not as much as they had on Syria.

### Other Arab states

6. Nuwar asked did we not have influence on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. I said that while our relations with these countries were very cordial, we had very little influence on them, nor would we wish to use it since this would be construed as counter-productive meddling. I thought the Kuwaitis' attitude to Jordan, though basically they fully supported the King, would have to take account of their large Palestinian population. The Amir was rather touchy and sensitive to flattery and it was possible that he had been upset by the scant regard paid to his mediation offer. Nuwar said that the Amir had told the King privately that Kuwait would resume payments but he was very grateful for my tip and would see to it that it was put right. He himself would probably be visiting

Good!  
R.E.  
24/10

/Kuwait

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Kuwait shortly as the King's special representative Nuwar remarked in exasperation that Jordan really must realise that she was a small and poor country who simply could not afford gratuitously to give offence to other countries. The row with India at the Rabat Moslem summit had been a similar piece of ineptitude. It would have been quite possible to have placated the Pakistanis, with whom Jordan had the warmest of relations, without so offending India that Jordan had lost her phosphate market there.

News 15  
me.

R.E.

24/10

?

7. On Egypt, Nuwar claimed to know the Egyptian leaders very well. Sadat was a simple and honourable man with little brains or ability. His chief characteristic had been his fanatical and unswerving devotion to Nasser. Nuwar thought that the other contenders for power would try to maintain an outward appearance of unity, since what they most had to fear was some other unknown Army officer who might do a Nasser on them. Nuwar was convinced that Egypt and the Egyptian Army wanted peace.

#### Future of the fedayeen

8. Nuwar thought that Fateh had over the past year modified their militant all-or-nothing stand on the Israeli question. They now had a more realistic assessment of their chances of overthrowing Israel by force. I asked whether, as it became apparent that the Fateh line was not going to get Palestine back, more support would not switch to left wing revolutionary views. Nuwar doubted it: the PFLP could still only exist under Fateh protection. He was convinced that Fateh still entirely dominated the resistance movement. He knew the Sa'iqa leaders very well, for nearly all of them were ex Jordanian Army Officers, and he knew that Sa'iqa was "terrified" of Fateh.

#### Future of Jordan

9. An immediate start must be made on stamping out corruption in high places. Much more should be done to improve the lot of the Jordanian peasants who were exploited by landlords and

/middlemen

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7 middlemen. Much would now have to be done to restore the confidence of small businessmen and hoped the banks would be helpful. I remarked that I had discussed this with one of the British banks who were anxious to be as helpful as they could. But the Jordan Government should take a close look at the Agricultural Credit Corporation which seemed to be far too rigid in its rules so that many of the poorer and deserving farmers, whom it was established to help, got no assistance at all. Nuwar entirely agreed. Looking at the longer term he found it difficult to see how Jordan could survive economically, if a settlement returned the West Bank but required them to absorb all the refugees. The return of the West Bank meant the immediate cessation of the Khartoum payments.

10. Finally I asked Nuwar what single thing he thought H.M.G. could do to help Jordan. He replied "Establish good relations with Egypt".

(B.L. Strachan)  
14 October, 1970

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NEQ 3/548/1

4/11/70

(b) Baghdad home service in Arabic (i) 06.00 and (ii) 19.00 GMT 2.11.70

(i) Excerpts from press review quotation of 'Ath-Thawrah' commentary 'The Balfour Declaration and the need for the popular struggle':

29

Fifty-three years have passed since Britain issued its sinister Declaration through its Foreign Secretary, Balfour, pledging to establish a national homeland in Palestine for the Jews...

B. fmm (1) XA

ME/3525/A/5

NEQ 3/548/1 9/5

4/11/70

Britain, the traditional enemy of the Arabs, is the same Britain which committed the ugliest crimes against the Arab people in Egypt, Iraq and the Arab South. It is the same Britain which now continues to supply arms and equipment to the Zionist enemy. The Palestine issue is the number one Arab issue. The Arab masses will continue their armed struggle to liberate their usurped homeland. As our Party has affirmed, the only solution for the Arab issues - foremost of which is the Palestine issue - is the popular movement's adoption of an organised, revolutionary, progressive course that would eliminate injustice at home and abroad and would put the Arabs on course for the modern era and immortal human values.

While our masses are experiencing the effects of the conspiratorial onslaught of June, many solutions are appearing in our arena aimed at Zionising Palestine permanently. Our Arab masses, while turning the criminal Balfour Declaration anniversary into an opportunity to renew the struggle against plots hatched in the dark, strongly reject anything other than complete liberation. Any plan for a weak entity intended to kill the Palestine issue under the guise of Palestine rights is rejected by the masses, who threw off the yoke of guardianship imposed on them after the Balfour Declaration and believe in the armed struggle as the only course to liberation and unity.

(ii) Excerpts from speech by Revolution Command Council member and Minister of Industry, Taha al-Jazrawi, on behalf of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr at a rally in Baghdad on 2nd November to commemorate the Balfour Declaration anniversary (broadcast from a recording):

The history of the Arab campaign against imperialism, as well as the history of all peoples resisting imperialist domination, has proved that conscious and organised masses always achieve victory...

The Palestine Resistance emerged with the beginning of Zionist aggression. This Resistance comes nearer to victory when initiative is in the hands of the masses and is further from it when it is dominated by inept leadership and when its movement is infiltrated by agents trying to abort it.

The Socialist Arab Ba'th Party has been in the forefront of the revolutionary forces which truly and objectively realise that popular armed struggle is the only way to liberation. It has also realised that the revolutionary and efficient organisation of the masses is a necessary condition for steadfastness and victory. Brothers, the Party of Arab revolution - the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party - has committed the Iraqi region to its principles and defined the revolutionary path in the light of the peoples' experience and out of a belief in the inevitability of victory. The 17th July revolution with all its resources will remain the main stream supporting the Palestine revolution and a vanguard force in the struggle for unity, freedom and socialism.

The forces of Arab reaction and agents are spreading rumours and casting doubts in an attempt to drive a wedge between the Palestine revolution and its main streams and tributaries, in order to implement liquidationist and capitulationist solutions. However, the masses of our fighting nation are capable of facing all the plots with a steadfast Arab front in which all the revolutionary forces in the Arab world will stand united in confronting the enemy, thwarting his plots and isolating his agents...

(c) Baghdad "Voice of the Palestine Revolution" in Hebrew 18.00 GMT 2.11.70

Excerpt from report:

... Today Britain is encouraging the establishment of a State for the Palestinian people and is promising to guard and protect it, on condition that it comes to terms with the de facto Zionist entity in Palestine. This poses the question: where does Home suggest we establish the Palestine State - on Jordanian soil, in the West Bank, or in



M. E. G. L. L. L.

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16/11/70

Mr. C. C. C. C. C.

Mr. A. A. A. A. A.

Mr. H. H. H. H. H.

Secretary of State

Sir Philip Adams. L. L.

R. M. Evans

Encl.

PG 24/11

1/11

13 November 1970.

Mr. Royle reported to me that Mr. Amery has been saying various things which do not seem wholly in accord with Government policy in relation to the Middle East. At my suggestion, therefore, Mr. Amery came to see me today to let me have his views.

2. He expressed concern on three main points:

(1) our policy in the Gulf;

(2) our relationship with King Hussein; and

(3) the internal position in Iraq.

3. On (1) he expressed the very firm hope that we would not withdraw our position in the Gulf at the end of 1971. I told him that no decisions had been taken as yet about what our ultimate policy would be but that it was quite clear that none of the States concerned would be willing to request us to stay in the area. It was therefore a matter of deciding what we could do without encouraging developments of the kind that took place in Aden.

4. Mr. Amery said that he hoped that at least we would retain 1 battalion of troops in the Gulf. I said I thought that 1 battalion would be very difficult indeed to arrange. What was more likely would be the possibility of some smaller units in advisory or training capacities but I emphasised that no decisions of any kind had yet been taken.

5. With regard to King Hussein, he was apparently basing himself on conversations between the King, Hassan and Sharif Nasser on the one hand, and Billy Mclean on the other. He said that first Hassan, and then the King, had spoken in strong terms about Britain's unwillingness to give the King the full support that he needed at a critical stage in his internal struggle. It appears that

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this refers to his appeals for help when the Syrians were advancing southward towards Amman. I said that, if this criticism was valid against us, it was equally valid against the Americans and the Israelis. I further said that we took the view that overt intervention at that time would have had disastrous effects for King Hussein whatever else it might have done.

6. Mr. Amery then said that King Hussein also felt that the British underestimated the extent of his defeat of the fedayeen. The King's view was that he had crushed the fedayeen but he got the impression that the British still felt that the fedayeen were a strong force in Jordan. He felt that, because of this wrong assessment, Britain was not being as helpful as she might be. I noted this but said that I found it difficult to understand this view because we felt that we had given all reasonable help to him.

7. He then advanced the idea that King Hussein might be willing to do a separate deal to reach a peace settlement with Israel. I said to him that I doubted this very much because I thought, if he were to do a separate deal, this would damn him irretrievably in the eyes of every other Arab state.

8. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that when I was in Israel last week I was asked whether I thought that King Hussein would be willing to do a separate deal with the Israeli Government. I replied in exactly the same sense then, but it does seem strange that the same idea should have been put forward from two such totally different sources.

9. Mr. Amery's third point was that he felt that the present disorders in Iraq could lead to the overthrow of the present Government and that any alternative Government in Iraq must be an improvement on the present one. He suggested that Israel might be encouraged to supply arms and equipment to the opponents of the present régime in Baghdad. I replied that Israeli

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3.

intelligence was such that, if there were any prospect of this, they would be quite capable of arranging it without any intervention from us and I felt that it was best that we kept well clear of any such idea. Mr. Amery then said that, if there were a change of régime in Baghdad, he hoped that we would make early attempts to get on good terms with them because he felt that Iraq was in a very important strategic position and if we could improve our relations there it would be of considerable help to us in regard to our problems in the Gulf.

10. From all this it is clear that Mr. Amery is anxious that we should play a more active part in the whole Middle East area. I tried to dampen down some of his enthusiasm but I urged him to keep in close touch with me because I would rather he should be putting his suggestions to me than airing them with other colleagues in the Smoking Room of the House of Commons.



(Joseph Godber)  
10 November, 1970

Copies:

Permanent Under-Secretary  
Sir P. Adams  
Mr. Acland  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. Tesh

SECRET



Mr Epton

LAST PAPER

Mr Godless minute at p (30).

Paragraph 9. Mr Amery, the Jordanians  
(and probably the Israelis!) all seem to  
resemble to the same erroneous belief - that  
the next Iraqi regime will be "better" than  
the present one!

MMHumbell  
25/x1

Yes. Time won't show.

25/x1

LAST PAPER

P.O. MM  
26/x1



British Role In Middle East; Iraqi View That Britain Sympathises With Ba'athists; British Official Believes Saddam Best Hope For Iraq. Political Relations Between UK And Iraq. 4 Feb. 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1255. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475972/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=828e4434&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475972/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=828e4434&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.